42 F.4th 1131
9th Cir.2022Background
- Jones Day, in arbitration with a former partner (arbitration seated in Washington, D.C.), sought subpoenas from the arbitrator for documents from Orrick, a third-party law firm headquartered in San Francisco.
- Orrick refused to comply with initial subpoenas; Jones Day filed in D.C. Superior Court which dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and indicated FAA §7 requires a U.S. district court filing.
- The arbitrator then issued revised summonses requiring two Orrick partners to appear in San Jose (Northern District of California); Orrick again refused.
- Jones Day filed petitions to enforce the arbitral summonses in the Northern District of California; the district court dismissed, holding it could not compel attendance because the arbitration seat was Washington, D.C., and it construed FAA §7 as limiting enforcement to the district where the arbitrators sit.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit (1) held §203 of Chapter Two of the FAA confers federal subject-matter jurisdiction over enforcement petitions that relate to arbitrations falling under the New York Convention, and (2) held §204’s venue provision is permissive and supplements the general venue statute (28 U.S.C. §1391), so the Northern District of California was a proper forum; the court reversed and remanded with instructions to enforce the summonses.
Issues
| Issue | Jones Day's Argument | Orrick's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. §203 to hear petitions to enforce arbitrator-issued summonses in an international arbitration | Such enforcement petitions are "actions or proceedings falling under the Convention" because they relate to and are ancillary to an arbitration covered by the Convention | §203 jurisdiction is limited to the specific actions listed in Chapter Two (e.g., compelling arbitration, confirming awards); petitions to enforce summonses are not covered | Held: §203 jurisdiction extends to actions if (1) the underlying arbitration agreement/award falls under the Convention and (2) the proceeding relates to that agreement/award (adopting a broad, functional test) |
| Whether 9 U.S.C. §204’s venue provision is exclusive or permissive (i.e., whether enforcement must be in the district embracing the place of arbitration) | §204 is non-exclusive and supplements general venue rules (28 U.S.C. §1391); therefore venue is proper where defendant resides or has principal place of business | §204 (and §201’s “shall be enforced in accordance with this chapter”) requires use of Chapter Two’s venue rules rather than general venue statute | Held: §204 is permissive/supplemental to §1391; Northern District of California was a proper venue under §1391; dismissal for improper venue was error |
| Whether FAA §7 limits district-court enforcement of arbitral summonses to the district where the arbitrators "are sitting" (i.e., the seat) | An arbitrator may effectively "sit" in more than one location, and venue may lie where enforcement is appropriate under §204/§1391 | Enforcement is limited to the district where the arbitrators sit (here, D.C.) | Court did not need to resolve the precise scope of §7’s territorial wording because it held §204 is permissive and §1391 supplied proper venue; thus dismissal was erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637 (Supreme Court decision endorsing use of domestic doctrines to fill gaps in the New York Convention)
- Stemcor USA Inc. v. CIA Siderurgica do Para Cosipar, 927 F.3d 906 (5th Cir. 2019) (held §203 jurisdiction covers proceedings that relate to Convention-governed arbitrations)
- Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012) (recognized §203 jurisdiction to vacate an arbitral award not explicitly listed in Chapter Two)
- Inversiones y Procesadora Tropical INPROTSA, S.A. v. Del Monte Int’l GmbH, 921 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2019) (construed §203 broadly to include proceedings implicating Convention interests)
- Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000) (held FAA venue provisions permissive and not to supplant general venue statute)
- Textile Unlimited, Inc. v. A..BMH & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2001) (applied Cortez Byrd to hold FAA venue provisions supplement §1391)
- Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009) (interpreting §205’s removal and related jurisdictional concepts)
- Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (Chapter One of the FAA grants access to federal procedures but confers no independent federal-question jurisdiction)