Jonathon Castro v. County of Los Angeles
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14950
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Castro, a pretrial detainee arrested for public intoxication, was placed in a West Hollywood "sobering cell" that lacked audio monitoring and only intermittent visual checks.
- Gonzalez, a combative felony arrestee, was later placed in the same cell; Castro banged on the door for help but officers did not timely intervene; Gonzalez severely beat Castro, leaving him with catastrophic brain injuries.
- A jury found individual LASD officers (Solomon and Valentine), the County of Los Angeles, and LASD liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; defendants appealed and the case was heard en banc in the Ninth Circuit.
- The panel addressed (1) whether individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity and whether they acted with deliberate indifference, and (2) whether the County/LASD are liable under Monell for a custom or policy and deliberate indifference.
- The Ninth Circuit majority held Kingsley’s objective standard for pretrial-detainee claims applies to failure-to-protect claims, set an objective recklessness-type test for individual liability, and affirmed municipal liability based on a custom/policy of using inadequately monitored sobering cells and half-hour checks.
- Judges Callahan and Ikuta partially dissented as to municipal liability and the majority’s extension of Kingsley to failure-to-protect claims, arguing the record did not show a municipal deliberate choice or sufficient notice and that Kingsley is inapposite to omissions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qualified immunity for individual officers | Castro: officers violated pretrial-detainee due process right to protection from other inmates; right clearly established | Officers: broad duty description is insufficiently specific; they lack requisite state of mind | Denied; right was clearly established and jury evidence supports liability |
| Standard for pretrial detainee failure-to-protect (subjective vs objective) | Castro: previous Ninth Circuit Clouthier required subjective deliberate indifference; but Kingsley supports an objective standard | Defendants: failure-to-protect requires subjective awareness (Farmer/Clouthier) | Majority: Kingsley applies; adopt a four-part test imposing an objective, recklessness-like standard (intentional decision + substantial risk + objectively unreasonable inaction + causation) |
| Municipal (Monell) liability — existence of policy/custom causing injury | Castro: County had a longstanding custom/policy of using noncompliant sobering cells with inadequate monitoring and 30-minute checks that caused harm | County: cell design/monitoring not a municipal policy; building-code adoption had a grandfather clause; no deliberate choice or notice; would be respondeat superior | Affirmed: jury could find a deliberate municipal custom/policy and constructive notice (County adoption of building-code standards and station manual); evidence supports causation and deliberate indifference |
| Adequacy of jury instructions and causation for entities | Castro: instructions properly focused jury on the alleged custom and causation; evidence showed alternatives existed and risk was obvious | County: instructions and record did not establish a municipal deliberate choice or causal link; error to hold entity liable | Court: instructions proper; substantial evidence supported causal link and municipal deliberate indifference |
Key Cases Cited
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (prison officials must protect inmates from known substantial risks; subjective-aware-and-disregard test under Eighth Amendment)
- Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (pretrial detainees may not be punished; conditions amounting to punishment violate Fourteenth Amendment)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires a policy or custom causing the violation)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (municipal deliberate indifference for failure-to-train: need so obvious that policymakers are deliberately indifferent)
- Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (Monell requires municipal action to be the moving force and deliberate indifference is stringent)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework: (1) constitutional violation, (2) clearly established law)
- Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) (pretrial-detainee excessive-force claims require only an objective unreasonableness standard; majority extended reasoning to failure-to-protect claims)
- Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009) (Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect: liability for conscious disregard of substantial risk)