Jonathan Lopez v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 21-11076

Jonathan Lopez, a Florida prisoner serving life for multiple violent offenses, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for advising him to reject a 25‑year plea on the day of trial.
Lopez did not raise that claim in his initial state post‑conviction (Rule 3.850) motion, so the claim was procedurally defaulted in state court.
He argued Martinez v. Ryan excused the default because his post‑conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim and the claim was substantial.
The district court found the claim procedurally defaulted and not excused under Martinez because the underlying trial‑counsel claim lacked merit; the state had offered the same plea three times and Lopez refused each time.
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the matter and affirmed, holding Martinez did not apply because Lopez failed to show trial counsel was deficient or that prejudice (acceptance of the plea/court acceptance/lesser sentence) was reasonably probable.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Martinez v. Ryan excuses procedural default of an IAC plea‑offer claim	Martinez applies because post‑conviction counsel was ineffective and the underlying IAC claim is substantial	Martinez not met: post‑conviction counsel not ineffective (because trial counsel was not deficient) and the underlying claim lacks merit	Martinez not satisfied; procedural default not excused
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for advising rejection of a 25‑year plea	Lopez would have accepted the 25‑year plea but for counsel’s advice	Record shows Lopez refused identical offers three times; no evidence he intended to plead guilty; counsel’s performance not deficient	No deficient performance or prejudice shown; IAC claim fails
Whether Lopez demonstrated prejudice required for Frye/Lafler (acceptance by defendant, prosecution, and court; lesser sentence)	Lopez would have accepted the offer and the plea would have been accepted, yielding a lesser sentence	No record evidence the court would accept 25 years when mandatory minimum was life; petitioner bears burden to show these probabilities	Lopez failed to show reasonable probability prosecution or court would have accepted or that sentence would be less severe
Whether the district court erred in denying § 2254 relief	District court erred in finding default/merit	District court correctly applied Martinez/Strickland and dismissed petition	Affirmed: district court did not err

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑prong deficient performance and prejudice test for IAC)
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (requires showing defendant would have accepted, prosecution would not withdraw, and court would accept plea offer for plea‑offer IAC claims)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (adds that conviction or sentence would have been less severe to show prejudice)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (permits excuse of procedural default when post‑conviction counsel was ineffective and the claim is substantial)
Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (defines "substantial" as debatable among jurists of reason)
Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir.) (allocates burden to petitioner to prove Strickland prejudice in plea contexts)
Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir.) (presumption that counsel’s performance is reasonable)
Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir.) (procedural default/exhaustion principles)
Agan v. Singletary, 12 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir.) (counsel must give informed advice about plea vs. trial)