Jonathan Lamar Perkins v. State
A21A0994
| Ga. Ct. App. | Jul 23, 2021Background
- Detectives went to Rossville to interview a suspect’s nephew about an allegedly stolen car; they had a victim report identifying the nephew as the borrower who had not returned the vehicle.
- As detectives approached the nephew’s residence, they observed a white male leave on a motorcycle who matched the nephew’s general build.
- One detective stopped the motorcycle to check identity; the rider repeatedly reached toward his pocket despite commands to stop, the detective grabbed his hand, and the rider said he had a pistol.
- Once the rider’s helmet was removed he was identified as Jonathan Perkins, who admitted he was a convicted felon and said two more guns were in his backpack; the backpack search recovered two handguns, methamphetamine, marijuana, and cash.
- Perkins was convicted of trafficking methamphetamine, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, two counts of possession of a firearm during a felony, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
- On appeal Perkins challenged the stop/search (motion to suppress) and asserted ineffective assistance of counsel for opening statements and for not moving for a mistrial; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Perkins' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legality of the stop/search (reasonable suspicion for stop of a suspect in a completed felony and mistake of identity) | Detectives lacked reasonable, specific suspicion to stop because the vehicle theft was completed, the victim was unnamed in testimony, and the stop was based on an unreasonable identity match | Detectives had founded suspicion based on a victim report that the nephew failed to return a car and reasonably (objectively) mistook Perkins for the nephew given race, similar build, and that the motorcycle left the nephew’s residence | Stop was lawful: reasonable suspicion supported the investigatory stop for a completed felony and a reasonable mistake of identity does not invalidate the stop |
| Opening statement allegedly opening the door to felon-status evidence | Defense statement that Perkins was arrested for "the gun in his pocket" improperly opened the door to the state’s introduction of Perkins’ felon status | Defense counsel made a deliberate trial strategy to challenge the stop/search; the tactic was reasonable even if unsuccessful | No deficient performance; strategic choice was reasonable and does not establish ineffective assistance |
| Failure to move for mistrial after detective testified about a prohibited statement | Counsel should have moved for a mistrial when the detective mentioned Perkins’ statement that there were two guns in his backpack (contrary to Jackson–Dénno ruling) | Court sustained counsel’s objection and testimony that the search recovered two guns was admissible and made the statement cumulative | No deficient performance; objecting (not moving for mistrial) was a reasonable tactical choice because the testimony was cumulative |
| Combined-effect claim of counsel errors | The combined errors likely affected the verdict | The alleged errors were not constitutionally deficient individually, so there is no cumulative prejudice | No cumulative ineffective-assistance prejudice; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (authorizes brief investigative stops on reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (investigative stop permissible to investigate completed felony when based on specific and articulable facts)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (reasonable mistakes of fact can make a seizure lawful)
- Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (arrest of a person reasonably mistaken for a suspect is valid)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Clark v. State, 300 Ga. 899 (strategic choices by counsel are not per se deficient)
- Brown v. State, 297 Ga. 685 (no deficient performance where testimony was cumulative)