Jonathan Henslee v. Alvin Keller
681 F.3d 538
4th Cir.2012Background
- Henslee, an inmate at AXCI, appeals a district court dismissal for failure to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment grooming policy context.
- He alleged inmate barbers failed to disinfect razor heads, smeared saliva on a razor, and refused to clean razors, creating risk of infections.
- The district court previously dismissed two of Henslee’s prior complaints for failure to state a claim, making this dismissal sua sponte a third strike under § 1915(g).
- The district court concluded the grooming policy satisfied public health-safety requirements and denied deliberate indifference.
- On appeal, Henslee sought to proceed IFP, and the court of appeals granted IFP pending resolution of whether a district court dismissal counts as a strike when an appeal is pending.
- The central issue is how to count “prior occasions” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) for purposes of IFP on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court dismissal counts as a strike for § 1915(g) when an appeal is pending. | Henslee argues underlying dismissal should count as strike immediately, barring IFP on appeal. | Appellees contend dismissals count as strikes regardless of appeal status. | A district court dismissal cannot count as a strike for purposes of IFP on appeal. |
| What qualifies as a ‘prior occasion’ under § 1915(g) for counting strikes. | Three strikes can include prior dismissals that were final and unappealed. | Three strikes should include any prior dismissals regardless of finality or appeal status. | ‘Occasions’ includes both the underlying action and its appeal; a underlying dismissal alone does not count as a strike. |
| Whether Congress intended § 1915(g) to preclude appellate review of district court errors. | Strict interpretation would erase appellate review due to third-strike counting. | Legislative intent to deter frivolous suits could support counting dismissals as strikes. | Congress did not intend to eliminate the appellate function; the court adopts the majority approach to preserve review. |
Key Cases Cited
- Silva v. Di Vittorio, 358 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2004) (majority rule: dismissal not a strike until appeal exhausted)
- Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finality implied; prevents eliminating appellate review)
- Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996) (federal dissallowance of counting dismissal as a strike prior to exhaustion)
- Jennings v. Natrona County Detention Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775 (10th Cir. 1999) (counting dismissals only after exhaustion aligns with § 1915(g) purpose)
- Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2010) (majority-rule framework discussed in context of ‘occasions’)
- Pigg v. F.B.I., 106 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1997) (precedent that underlying dismissal may not count as a strike)
