863 F.3d 428
5th Cir.2017Background
- Jonathan Boyer was arrested in 2002 for a murder; he confessed; trial occurred in 2009 after ~7 years of pretrial delay.
- Initial charge was first-degree murder (death-eligible) for ~5 years; later reduced to second-degree murder and armed robbery; multiple counsel changes occurred.
- Major part of the delay centered on dispute/uncertainty over state funding for defense counsel and repeated continuances (some with defense assent); hurricanes and competency proceedings also contributed.
- At trial Boyer blamed his brother Anthony for the killing; Anthony testified for the State under a plea arrangement. Defense sought to impeach Anthony with alleged prior domestic violence and to present an expert (Dr. Solomon Fulero) on false confessions; both were excluded by the state courts.
- Boyer was convicted and sentenced to life without parole; state appellate and supreme courts upheld rulings; U.S. Supreme Court dismissed cert. as improvidently granted after briefing and opinions; federal habeas relief was denied and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Speedy-trial (Sixth Amendment) — whether 7-year delay violated right | Delay resulted from systemic failure to fund indigent defense; such state-caused delay must be charged to the State | Most delay attributable to defense requests/continuances; state complied where possible; Supreme Court already declined relief | Denied — state appellate court’s Barker balancing not objectively unreasonable under AEDPA; although court erred in weighing funding, overall balance was reasonable |
| Cross-examination of Anthony about alleged domestic violence and lack of prosecution (Confrontation/Right to present defense) | Exclusion prevented showing Anthony’s violent propensity and possible bias; lack of prosecution could show motive to cooperate | Louisiana evidence rules restrict inquiry into uncharged/nonconvicted acts; prosecution argued prejudice/confusion and no prospect of prosecution | Denied — state court’s exclusion not contrary to Supreme Court precedent and was a reasonable application; relevance outweighed by prejudice/confusion under AEDPA review |
| Exclusion of expert testimony on confessions (right to present defense; Daubert admissibility) | Expert testimony on false confessions was central to contesting voluntariness/credibility of Boyer’s confession; categorical exclusion violates right to present defense | Trial court/State asserted Daubert reliability concerns and that expert would usurp jury’s role; any exclusion harmless given confession evidence | Denied — state appellate decision upholding exclusion not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law under AEDPA; fairminded jurists could agree with exclusion/Daubert concerns |
| Evidentiary hearing request on funding causation (procedural fact-finding) | Boyer sought hearing to develop record that funding failure caused the delay | State argues record suffices and Supreme Court already addressed aspects; AEDPA deference limits need for new hearing | Denied — state-court factual findings on funding are entitled to AEDPA deference; no entitlement to additional hearing given record and §2254 limits |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (U.S. 1992) (presumptive prejudice from excessive postindictment delay)
- Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (U.S. 2009) (systemic failures in public defense can be charged to the State)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) (admissibility/reliability framework for expert testimony)
- Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (U.S. 1986) (blanket exclusion of evidence about confession circumstances can violate right to present a defense)
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (U.S. 1973) (state evidentiary rules may not be applied mechanistically to exclude critical evidence implicating innocence)
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974) (right to expose witness bias through cross-examination)
- United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (U.S. 1998) (States have latitude to exclude evidence like polygraph; exclusion must not be arbitrary or disproportionate)
- Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (U.S. 1987) (per se evidentiary bans that unduly limit defense testimony can violate the right to present witnesses)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (U.S. 2011) (AEDPA deference standard; state-court rulings afforded wide leeway)