Jonatan Perez v. the State of Texas
08-19-00155-CR
| Tex. App. | Jun 21, 2021Background
- On July 8, 2018, El Paso PD Officers Eric Rinker and Victor Hernandez stopped Jonatan Perez for driving without lights; dash‑cam recorded the initial encounter.
- Perez was handcuffed attempt; he broke free, ran ~20 feet, and a ~two‑minute physical struggle followed involving tackles, taser deployments, biting, and thrown taser prongs.
- Officer Hernandez suffered a fractured right hand, two months in a cast, and a permanently recessed knuckle; Officer Rinker sustained abrasions and taser shock. Medical records and testimony were admitted at trial.
- Perez was indicted on: Count I (aggravated assault on Hernandez, two alternative paragraphs describing manners of injury), Count II (assault on Rinker), and Count III (attempt to take a weapon). Jury convicted Counts I and II, acquitted Count III. Court sentenced Perez to 10 years on each count, concurrent, but suspended and placed him on 10 years community supervision.
- Perez appealed raising seven issues (legal sufficiency on various elements, jury‑charge unanimity/Due Process), and the court also addressed a defect in the trial court’s Certification of Right to Appeal (missing Perez signature).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Perez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Sufficiency that the bite caused "serious bodily injury" to Hernandez | Evidence of fractured hand, two months in cast, permanently recessed knuckle, medical records and photos support serious bodily injury | Bite did not cause the serious bodily injury alleged in paragraph A; insufficiency as to that specific manner | Affirmed. Evidence was legally sufficient to prove serious bodily injury and overall causation; paragraphs were alternative manners, not separate offenses |
| 2. Causation and culpability for Hernandez’s and Rinker’s injuries | Video, testimony of prolonged struggle, biting, throwing taser prongs, and resisting arrest support that Perez caused injuries and acted at least recklessly | Insufficient proof that Perez’s conduct (specific acts) caused the injuries or that he had required mental state for the injuries | Affirmed. A rational juror could infer causation and requisite intent/recklessness from the circumstances and conduct |
| 3. Jury‑charge unanimity on Count I (two paragraphs describe different acts) | The indictment listed alternative manners; unanimity required only on statutory elements (serious bodily injury to a public servant), not on which manner produced it | Jury could have convicted non‑unanimously by agreeing on different manners (bite vs. hand striking ground) | Affirmed. No unanimity error: manners/means were non‑statutory alternatives; jury must be unanimous only as to statutory elements |
| 4. Certification of right to appeal defective (missing defendant signature) | Certification as presented is defective; appellate counsel must notify defendant of PDR rights and deadlines | (Implicit) No prejudice argued that would reverse conviction | Court ordered counsel to comply with Tex. R. App. P. 48.4: forward opinion/judgment and notify Perez of PDR rights and deadlines |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (establishes legal‑sufficiency standard: evidence must permit a rational juror to find guilt beyond reasonable doubt)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (applies Jackson sufficiency standard in Texas criminal appeals)
- Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (analyzes materiality of variances and relation to unanimity)
- Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (framework for assessing non‑statutory variance and unit of prosecution)
- Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (unanimity requires jury agreement on a single discrete incident constituting the offense)
- Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (two‑pronged test for jury‑charge error and harm analysis)
- Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (U.S. 1991) (juror unanimity limited to statutory elements of the offense)
- Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (for result‑of‑conduct crimes, State must prove defendant caused the result with requisite intent)
- Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (sufficiency measured by elements defined in hypothetically correct jury charge)
- Ex parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (appellate counsel’s duty to inform defendant of affirmance and discretionary‑review options)