Jon Thompson v. Kel-Lee Bybee
161 Idaho 158
| Idaho Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Jon Thompson and Kel-Lee Bybee are unmarried parents of daughter A.T.; they previously entered a custody order later modified by stipulation when A.T. was 16.
- The modification stated the parties "share joint legal custody" and that Thompson would have primary physical and residential care.
- When A.T. was 17, Bybee (mother) consented to A.T.’s marriage under Idaho Code § 32-202; Thompson learned five days later.
- Thompson moved to hold Bybee in contempt for violating the custody-modification order; the magistrate convicted Bybee and the district court, on intermediate appeal, affirmed.
- On further appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court considered whether the custody order was a clear, unequivocal command that Bybee could not consent unilaterally to A.T.’s marriage and thus whether criminal contempt was proper.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the contempt judgment and awarded appellate costs to Bybee.
Issues
| Issue | Thompson's Argument | Bybee's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the custody-modification order clearly and unequivocally prohibited Bybee from consenting to A.T.’s marriage | The order incorporated the statutory definition of joint legal custody, which requires parents to share decisionmaking over a child’s general welfare (including marriage), so Bybee was required to share and obtain Thompson’s agreement | The order does not command any party to do or refrain from doing anything; moreover, Bybee has an independent statutory right to consent to a minor’s marriage under I.C. § 32-202 | Reversed: order did not clearly and unequivocally enjoin Bybee from consenting to the marriage; contempt improper |
| Whether contempt requires an order that commands action or restraint | Orders defining rights are sufficient to limit conduct | The custody language merely grants joint legal custody and does not command restraint; thus cannot support contempt | An order must command a person to do or refrain from doing something to support criminal contempt; this order did not |
| Whether importing I.C. § 32-717B(3) (definition of joint legal custody) makes the order enforceable as a command | The statutory definition makes the order impose shared decisionmaking duties that cover marriage | Even with the statutory definition, the order merely requires cooperation/agreement and is silent on deadlocks; it also conflicts with the separate statutory right to consent to marriage | Importing the definition does not render the order a clear prohibitory command; it remains insufficient for contempt |
| Whether Thompson is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-121 | Fees requested as prevailing party on contempt appeal | Bybee prevailed on appeal | Fees denied; Thompson did not prevail |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 224 P.3d 480 (Idaho 2009) (standard for appellate review of magistrate records by higher courts)
- State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 554, 181 P.3d 480 (Idaho 2008) (criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, including willfulness; order must be clear and unequivocal)
- Bald, Fat & Ugly, LLC v. Keane, 154 Idaho 807, 303 P.3d 166 (Idaho 2013) (an order that merely adjudicates a right but does not command action or restraint cannot support contempt)
- Albrethson v. Ensign, 32 Idaho 687, 186 P. 911 (Idaho 1920) (same principle: if an order does not command someone to do or refrain from doing something, disobedience is impossible)
- Carr v. Pridgen, 157 Idaho 238, 335 P.3d 578 (Idaho 2014) (parenting-order provisions requiring parties to reach agreement are ineffective as contempt bases when silent on duties after deadlock)