Jon Couzens, Jr. v. William Donohue
854 F.3d 508
8th Cir.2017Background
- Couzens, a Missouri resident, alleged Defendants (Donohue, the Catholic League, KCCL, and two KCCL directors) published false statements accusing him of murder involvement and other misconduct after he publicly alleged sexual abuse by priests.
- Statements were published in a Catholic League news release and posted on websites; Couzens sued in Missouri state court for defamation, invasion of privacy, and emotional distress; Defendants removed to federal court based on diversity.
- District court denied remand after concluding Missouri directors McLiney and O’Laughlin were fraudulently joined because the petition alleged conduct by KCCL, not by them personally.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting New York’s one-year defamation statute applied (statements first published in New York), Missouri does not recognize false-light invasion claims, and emotional-distress claims were unsupported.
- The district court granted dismissal; Couzens appealed removal denial and dismissal; the Eighth Circuit affirms in relevant part, including that KCCL’s late-filed consent to removal was sufficient and that the defamation and other tort claims were properly dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fraudulent joinder of Missouri directors (removal) | McLiney & O’Laughlin were sued as trustees and therefore properly joined | Petition alleges KCCL republished statements; no factual allegations against the directors individually | Directors were fraudulently joined; their consent unnecessary for removal; remand denied |
| Timeliness of KCCL’s consent to removal | KCCL’s consent, filed 31 days after notice, was untimely so removal defective | KCCL had consented before removal; later-filed ratification and related filings show sufficient consent | Court declines to set strict time rule under §1446(b)(2)(C) and holds KCCL’s consent was sufficient |
| Applicable statute of limitations for defamation | Missouri’s 2-year statute applies because injury occurred in Missouri and statements targeted Missouri | New York’s 1-year statute applies because statements were first published in New York; Missouri’s borrowing statute applies | Defamation claim time‑barred under Missouri’s borrowing statute applying New York’s one‑year rule; dismissal affirmed |
| Invasion of privacy and emotional distress claims | Couzens: false statements were part of an intrusive campaign supporting separate privacy/emotional‑distress claims | Defendants: claims rest on untrue statements and thus are subsumed by defamation; emotional‑distress elements not pled | Invasion of privacy (false‑light) not recognized for reputational injury; intentional and negligent emotional‑distress claims fail — dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Joyce v. Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, 635 F.3d 364 (8th Cir. 2011) (pleading standards and statute‑of‑limitations defense on Rule 12(b)(6))
- Patch v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 652 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1981) (cause of action "originates" where defamation first published for Missouri borrowing statute)
- Finnegan v. Squire Publishers, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (defamation claim originates where statement first published)
- Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182 (8th Cir. 2015) (unanimity/consent to removal; caution against hypertechnical application)
- Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (elements and limits of intentional infliction of emotional distress)