Jolyn Cullum v. Jan McCool
432 S.W.3d 829
| Tenn. | 2013Background
- On Feb. 7, 2011, Jo-lyn Cullum was injured in the Wal‑Mart parking lot when another customer, Jan McCool, backed her car into Cullum while Cullum was loading groceries.
- Wal‑Mart pharmacy employees had refused to fill McCool’s prescriptions because they believed she was intoxicated; McCool became belligerent and employees ordered her to leave, knowing she was alone and would be driving.
- Employees did not call police, detain McCool, or otherwise intervene before she drove away and struck Cullum.
- Cullums sued Wal‑Mart for negligence; Wal‑Mart moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial court granted dismissal; the Court of Appeals reversed.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed whether, taking the complaint allegations as true, Wal‑Mart owed a duty to protect Cullum from a known, intoxicated patron and held that the complaint sufficiently alleged such a duty.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wal‑Mart owed a duty to protect Cullum from a visibly intoxicated patron ordered to leave | Wal‑Mart knew McCool was intoxicated, belligerent, alone, and would drive; thus a duty to protect invitees arose | No legal duty to control or warn after an intoxicated patron leaves; cannot be forced to detain or call police in every case | Duty exists at pleading stage: foreseeability and gravity of harm outweigh the minimal burden on Wal‑Mart to act (balancing test) |
| Proper legal framework for business liability (scope of duty) | Apply McClung balancing approach weighing foreseeability/gravity vs. burden to defendant | Wal‑Mart urged McClung applies only to security/criminal attacks and is inapplicable here | McClung balancing is appropriate; intoxicated driving is foreseeable harm and falls within its scope |
| Whether the conduct was criminal or negligent for duty analysis | Plaintiff: intoxicated driving can be criminal and/or negligent, both actionable under McClung/Restatement §344 | Wal‑Mart: case differs from criminal‑attack precedents and prior cases limiting duties (e.g., off‑premises employer cases) | Court: classification unnecessary — duty can arise for reasonably foreseeable negligent or criminal acts on premises |
| Whether requiring intervention (e.g., calling 911) is an unreasonable burden | Plaintiff: minimal burden (calling police) and other non‑forceful measures are reasonable | Wal‑Mart: cannot be required to detain or use force; imposing broad obligations on retailers is onerous | Court: calling police is a minimal burden; obligation limited and fact‑specific, not a blanket duty to detain or screen patrons |
Key Cases Cited
- McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P’ship, 937 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1996) (adopted balancing approach: foreseeability and gravity of harm weighed against burden on business)
- Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008) (pleading‑stage duty analysis; courts must accept complaint allegations and reasonable inferences)
- Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359 (Tenn. 2009) (special‑relationship and foreseeability principles in premises liability)
- West v. East Tenn. Pioneer Oil Co., 172 S.W.3d 545 (Tenn. 2005) (duty not to sell gasoline to known intoxicated drivers; limited on physical restraint obligations)
- Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323 (Tenn. 2003) (recognition of the severity and commonality of harms from impaired drivers)
- McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. 1995) (foreseeability/gravity vs. burden balancing principle)