954 F.3d 1297
11th Cir.2020Background
- Anthony Ybarra Jr. attempted suicide by hanging; family and a neighbor (a former EMT) cut him down and bystanders immediately performed CPR and observed possible signs of life (faint pulse, exhalation).
- Deputy Gregory Spicher arrived, ordered bystanders to stop CPR (twice), called a "Signal 7" (reporting a deceased individual), and—based on the district court’s view of the evidence—did not check for signs of life before calling Signal 7.
- Paramedics later were permitted limited contact; one paramedic observed a heart rate of 24 bpm and resumed CPR; Ybarra was transported and died a week later.
- The Sheriff’s Internal Investigations Unit substantiated a dereliction-of-duty finding against Spicher for ordering cessation of CPR without sufficient facts.
- Waldron (personal representative) sued under the Fourteenth Amendment for a substantive due process violation; the district court denied Spicher qualified immunity at summary judgment; Spicher appealed.
- The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded, announcing that, given circuit precedent, mere recklessness or deliberate indifference by an officer ordering cessation of bystander CPR is not sufficient to establish a clearly established substantive due process violation; only conduct showing an intent to cause harm would be clearly established in this context.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Spicher violated clearly established substantive due process rights (qualified immunity) | Waldron: stopping CPR despite signs of life violated Ybarra’s due process rights and was clearly established | Spicher: case law (Hamilton, Lewis) shows reckless or deliberately indifferent interference is not clearly established; entitled to immunity | Vacated and remanded; court held recklessness/deliberate indifference insufficient to be "clearly established" here; remand to apply this standard |
| Proper level of culpability to clearly establish a due process violation | Deliberate indifference is sufficient | More than recklessness/deliberate indifference is required—at least intent to harm | Court: cannot treat deliberate indifference/ recklessness as clearly established here; only intent to cause harm would clearly establish violation given circuit precedent |
| Role of Hamilton and Lewis in the analysis | Waldron: Hamilton’s older analysis was superseded and offers little guidance | Spicher: Hamilton is part of the relevant legal landscape and supports immunity | Court: Hamilton remains relevant; Lewis sets "shocks the conscience" framework; combined, they show mere reckless interference is not clearly established law |
| Whether Spicher acted within discretionary authority | Waldron: argued Spicher lacked discretionary authority (raised on appeal) | Spicher: acted within scope of deputy’s duties | Court declined to decide discretionary-authority issue and left it for the district court on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Hamilton by and through Hamilton v. Cannon, 80 F.3d 1525 (11th Cir. 1996) (refused to treat officer’s interruption of bystander CPR as clearly established substantive-due-process violation)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (established "shocks the conscience" standard and emphasized context; high culpability required in non-custodial, split-second settings)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework: clearly established law inquiry)
- Nix v. Franklin Cty. Sch. Dist., 311 F.3d 1373 (11th Cir. 2002) (deliberate indifference insufficient for due-process violation in non-custodial setting)
- Waddell v. Hemerson, 329 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussed culpability levels for substantive due process; declined to fix precise threshold)