Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education
97 F. Supp. 3d 657
W.D. Pa.2015Background
- Johnston, a transgender man born female, attended University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown (UPJ) and sought to use men’s locker rooms/restrooms; he had changed name and some identity documents but did not provide a court order or new birth certificate to change sex marker on UPJ records.
- UPJ initially restricted his access to male facilities, offered a unisex referee locker room, then enforced a policy requiring birth-sex-based use of sex-segregated facilities.
- Johnston continued using male facilities, received multiple disorderly conduct citations, was disciplined, and ultimately expelled; he pled guilty to reduced misdemeanor charges.
- He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Equal Protection), Title IX, and state-law claims, alleging sex discrimination (including transgender status and gender nonconformity) and retaliation.
- Defendants moved to dismiss; the district court considered whether Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a public university from requiring restroom/locker-room use according to birth sex rather than gender identity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exclusion from male facilities because plaintiff is transgender violates Equal Protection | Johnston: treated differently from similarly situated males because of sex/transgender status and gender-nonconformity | UPJ: classification based on birth/biological sex is permissible to protect student privacy; transgender is not a suspect class; rational basis (or intermediate) review applies | Dismissed — transgender not recognized as suspect class; UPJ’s birth-sex policy survives review; plaintiff failed to plead discrimination "because of sex" |
| Whether Title IX prohibits discrimination on basis of transgender status | Johnston: Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination covers transgender status and gender-stereotyping claims | UPJ: Title IX’s plain language/regulatory scheme contemplates sex-segregated facilities; "sex" means male/female (birth sex); transgender status is not covered | Dismissed — Title IX does not, on its face, prohibit transgender-status claims; sex-segregated facilities allowed by regulation; no plausible Title IX violation pled |
| Whether a Price Waterhouse gender-stereotyping theory supports relief | Johnston: discrimination for failing to conform to gender stereotypes (i.e., identify as male) | UPJ: plaintiff did not allege harassment for appearance/behavior; allowed to live as male in most respects; restriction was classification by birth sex | Dismissed — complaint lacks allegations that adverse action was motivated by punishment for gender nonconformity; sex-stereotyping theory not adequately pleaded |
| Whether retaliation claim (including FBI referral) states a claim | Johnston: UPJ retaliated after he complained, including providing his name to FBI | UPJ: plaintiff alleges neither causal motive nor facts showing retaliatory animus or determinative effect; allegations are conclusory | Dismissed — retaliation allegations fail to allege causation or materially adverse action tied to protected complaints |
Key Cases Cited
- Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (transgender status not treated as protected class under Title VII; restroom usage restrictions permissible)
- Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (Title VII’s term “sex” construed traditionally; transsexual status not covered absent congressional change)
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (sex stereotyping is actionable sex discrimination)
- United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (gender-based classifications subject to heightened scrutiny; requires an exceedingly persuasive justification)
- Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (discrimination for gender nonconformity is sex-based under the Equal Protection Clause)
- Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976) (Title IX and Equal Protection challenges to sex-segregated education analyzed; sex-segregation not per se unlawful)
- Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009) (recognizes an implied private right of action under Title IX)