Johnson v. the State
328 Ga. App. 702
Ga. Ct. App.2014Background
- Defendant Steven Mark Johnson lived with victim L.L. and her mother R.L.; on March 23, 2009 L.L. alleges Johnson choked and raped her; she fled and reported the assault.
- Medical exam found four small scratches on L.L.’s neck and collected cervical swabs; sperm DNA matched Johnson.
- Johnson admitted sexual intercourse but claimed it was consensual; he wrote a 2009 letter to R.L. apologizing, saying he had "blacked out," and denying he could have penetrated her due to erectile dysfunction.
- At trial the jury convicted Johnson of rape (acquitted on aggravated assault); he was sentenced as a recidivist to life without parole; post-trial motion for new trial denied.
- On appeal Johnson challenged: denial of a mistrial after late disclosure of his 2009 letter, admission of officers’ testimony about the victim’s out‑of‑court statements, admission of two prior convictions for impeachment, limitation on a closing argument analogy, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Johnson) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mistrial for late disclosure of letter | Late production of his 2009 letter prejudiced trial preparation and warranted mistrial or exclusion | Letter was promptly produced under OCGA §17-16-4(c); court granted continuance (deferred jury) for defense to adjust | Court affirmed denial of mistrial; continuance was a proper remedy and no abuse of discretion |
| Admission of officers’ testimony recounting victim’s out‑of‑court statements (prior consistent statements) | Testimony was hearsay and inadmissible because no affirmative charge of recent fabrication justified rehabilitation | Testimony was admissible to bolster credibility (State elicited on direct) | Admission was erroneous (prior consistent statement rule not met) but harmless given other admissible evidence (ER statement, scratches, DNA) |
| Admission of prior convictions for impeachment (2004 burglary; 1989 terroristic threats) | Burglary was unfairly prejudicial; terroristic threats too remote or improper | Prior convictions admissible under former OCGA §24-9-84.1 balancing test | Trial court erred by not making an on‑record Clay analysis as to burglary, but error was harmless; admission of terroristic threats (court later explained Clay factors) not an abuse of discretion |
| Limiting objection to closing argument (prohibited Duke lacrosse analogy) | Counsel should have been allowed to analogize to well-known false rape allegations to argue fabrication theory | Such analogies may be improper if they introduce extrinsic facts not in evidence | Sustaining objection was error but harmless: defense had ample opportunity to argue fabrication and evidence against defendant was overwhelming |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (various failures) | Counsel failed to object/preserve objections to letter handling, hearsay, prior convictions, and jury instruction | Many objections would have been meritless; where counsel erred, defendant cannot show prejudice under Strickland | Most claimed failures were not deficient or did not cause prejudice; ineffective‑assistance claim denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑part test for ineffective assistance)
- Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822 (factors for balancing admissibility of prior convictions)
- Tubbs v. State, 276 Ga. 751 (mistrial/remedies for discovery violations and court discretion)
- Palma v. State, 280 Ga. 108 (presumption of harm for abridged closing argument and when it is overcome)