Johnson v. State
300 Ga. 252
| Ga. | 2016Background
- In April 2014 Sherwin Johnson was indicted for felony murder and related charges after a shooting; arrested April 23, 2014, and indicted in the June 2014 term.
- Johnson made multiple pro se and standby-counsel filings asserting speedy-trial rights (August 26 pro se; December 5 pro se demand; January-February 2015 demands via standby counsel).
- The trial court found the August 26 demand invalid (he was represented then) and ruled the December 5 demand untimely with respect to the statutory speedy-trial scheme and not properly served.
- On May 8, 2015 Johnson moved for discharge and acquittal under OCGA § 17-7-171 and constitutional speedy-trial claims; the trial court denied the motion and set trial dates. Johnson appealed the May 8 order.
- The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s statutory-speedy-trial ruling, but vacated and remanded as to the constitutional-speedy-trial claim because the trial court made no Barker-Doggett findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Johnson) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of statutory speedy-trial demand (OCGA §17-7-171) | December 5, 2014 demand was timely because court gave extra days after arraignment | Demand was untimely (indictment term June 2014; next term ended Nov. 28) and not properly served | Court affirmed: December 5 demand untimely/not effective; statutory ruling affirmed |
| Constitutional speedy-trial (Sixth Amendment & GA Const.) | Delay violated constitutional right; sought discharge | Court argued statutory ruling resolved appeal; alternatively no constitutional violation | Court vacated denial as to constitutional claim and remanded for findings under Barker-Doggett because trial court made no factual/conclusory findings |
| Whether interlocutory appeal was proper for constitutional claim | Johnson argued constitutional claim reviewable with statutory appeal | State: statutory ruling was appealable; constitutional claim could be considered with it under OCGA §5-6-34(d) | Court held constitutional claim was reviewable here but remand required for trial-court findings |
| Other trial-court rulings (continuances, plea entry, discovery, Brady) | Various claims of error (continuances, clerk entering not-guilty plea, Brady violations, defective indictment) | State defended routine discretion in scheduling/continuances; argued many claims premature or meritless | Court rejected Johnson’s other enumerations (no abuse of discretion; Brady issue not ripe; indictment dismissal not warranted) |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (established four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (delays can create presumption of prejudice; refines speedy-trial analysis)
- Higgenbottom v. State, 288 Ga. 429 (2011) (trial courts must enter findings of fact and conclusions of law under Barker)
- Buckner v. State, 292 Ga. 390 (2013) (appellate deference to trial court’s speedy-trial findings and rulings)
- Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872 (2010) (describes Barker-Doggett two-part framework applied in Georgia)
- Tolbert v. Toole, 296 Ga. 357 (2014) (statutory speedy-trial rulings are immediately appealable)