Johnson v. State, 477 S.W.3d 2

In 1995 Movant (Amy Johnson) pleaded guilty to second-degree assault and endangering the welfare of a child for recklessly shaking an infant, causing serious injury.
The victim died in 2007 from those injuries; the State later charged Movant with second-degree murder, then amended the charge to voluntary manslaughter.
Movant pleaded guilty in 2011 to voluntary manslaughter pursuant to a negotiated plea, admitting the State’s summary that she shook the child and the child later died; the court sentenced her to 14 years.
Movant filed a postconviction Rule 24.035 motion arguing (1) double jeopardy barred the manslaughter conviction because she had been previously convicted of assault for the same act and (2) collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of her mens rea because the prior conviction established recklessness, not knowing conduct.
The motion court denied relief; the appellate court reviews for clear error and affirms, holding Movant waived nonjurisdictional claims by knowingly pleading guilty and that collateral estoppel was not a jurisdictional bar.

Issue	Movant's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether voluntary manslaughter conviction violated double jeopardy because of earlier second‑degree assault conviction arising from the same act	Johnson: convictions constitute multiple punishments for the same offense; assault is a lesser‑included offense of manslaughter	State: Johnson waived double jeopardy by knowingly pleading guilty to the bargained‑for reduced charge; plea preserved no nonjurisdictional claims	Held: Affirmed. Plea waived the double‑jeopardy challenge; record does not show a facial jurisdictional defect preventing the manslaughter conviction
Whether collateral estoppel barred relitigation of mens rea (reckless vs. knowing)	Johnson: prior assault conviction necessarily decided recklessness, so plea court could not find she acted knowingly	State: Prior conviction for reckless assault is not inconsistent with later admission she knowingly caused the death; collateral estoppel not controlling	Held: Affirmed. Collateral estoppel claim is nonjurisdictional and was waived by voluntary, intelligent plea; prior judgment did not bar the manslaughter plea

Feldhaus v. State, 311 S.W.3d 802 (Mo. banc 2010) (guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional constitutional claims)
Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439 (Mo. banc 2002) (double jeopardy attaches when a guilty plea is unconditionally accepted)
State v. Neher, 213 S.W.3d 44 (Mo. banc 2007) (a guilty plea does not waive a double‑jeopardy claim if the record shows the court lacked power to enter the conviction)
Griffin v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. 1989) (a defendant who bargains for reduced charges by plea cannot later raise double‑jeopardy to challenge the reduced convictions)
Diaz v. U.S., 223 U.S. 442 (1912) (delayed death after a prior conviction of a nonhomicide offense may permit subsequent homicide prosecution because death is a consummating element)
Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (same‑elements test for double jeopardy)