Johnson v. State, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 877

Defendant (appellant) was tried for capital murder in connection with the 2010 killing of William Thompson and convicted; sentence: life without parole.
Two State witnesses (Joseph and Stefan Kennedy) had pending felony indictments in Harris County at the time of trial (the specific charges included first‑degree theft and aggravated robbery among others).
Defense sought to cross‑examine those witnesses about the specific felony offenses and the applicable punishment ranges (e.g., 5–99 years or life) to show bias; the trial court limited cross‑examination to whether the pending charges were felonies or misdemeanors and disallowed details about the nature and punishment ranges.
On appeal the First Court of Appeals upheld the limitation; the appellant petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals arguing the limitation violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right to effective cross‑examination.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed: distinguishing between the relevancy of the nature of offenses (not sufficiently probative) and punishment ranges (marginally probative), the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate the Confrontation Clause because the defense was allowed to show a witness’s vulnerable relationship with the State (felony vs misdemeanor) and to probe bias.

Issue	Appellant's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by precluding cross‑examination about the specific pending felony charges and their punishment ranges	Johnson: Specific felony types and punishment ranges are necessary to establish a logical/causal connection showing witness bias and thus are protected by the Confrontation Clause	State: Asking whether charges were felonies (vs misdemeanors) sufficed to show vulnerability; details about offense type and punishment range are cumulative, marginal, or prejudicial and within trial court discretion to exclude	The court affirmed. Nature of the charges (specific felony types) was not relevant to bias; punishment ranges were marginally probative but exclusion did not render cross‑examination ineffective—trial court acted within its discretion and did not violate the Confrontation Clause

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (confrontation rule emphasizes face‑to‑face cross‑examination as central)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (limits on cross‑examination analyzed under whether defendant had opportunity for effective cross‑examination)
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (impeachment for bias is a central purpose of cross‑examination)
Carpenter v. State, 979 S.W.2d 633 (evidence of unrelated pending charges excluded where no logical connection to bias)
Irby v. State, 327 S.W.3d 138 (probationary/vulnerable status alone insufficient to show bias without logical connection)
Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494 (impeachment by evidence of incarceration/pending serious charges may be relevant to show motive or bias)
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (exclusion of central, reliable, exculpatory evidence can violate the defendant’s right to present a defense)