Johnson v. Salvation Army, 957 N.E.2d 485

Johnson, a beneficiary in Salvation Army’s adult rehabilitation program, was injured as a passenger in a Salvation Army vehicle driven by a Salvation Army employee during work therapy.
He signed a beneficiary admittance statement that included a broad exculpatory clause releasing the Center from liability for injuries.
He also signed a Room & Board Agreement; both forms stated beneficiaries are not employees and outlined program requirements.
Plaintiff argued the exculpatory clause violated public policy and did not cover his injury, while defendants asserted it barred his claims.
The circuit court granted summary judgment for defendants on the exculpatory defense; the appellate court affirmed.
Plaintiff had the option to leave the program and could have pursued alternatives for rehabilitation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the exculpatory clause violates public policy	Johnson argues the waiver is against public policy due to employment-like relationship or bargaining power	Salvation Army contends beneficiary status, voluntary participation, and lack of employment negate public policy bar	Exculpatory clause not against public policy; not an employment relationship; no bargaining-power disparity justify enforcement
Whether plaintiff’s relationship was akin to employment	Johnson contends the relationship resembled employer-employee duties	Court should treat him as beneficiary, not employee, with work therapy as rehabilitation	Not an employee; beneficiary relationship upheld
Whether there was a disparity of bargaining power invalidating the waiver	Plaintiff asserts economic compulsion/limited alternatives undermine free choice	Plaintiff had alternatives and entered program voluntarily	No material bargaining power disparity; waiver valid
Whether the exculpatory clause covers the underlying injury	Clause did not clearly encompass this specific accident	Clause broadly covers injuries during participation in the program	Exculpatory clause unambiguous and covers injuries during work therapy and related activities
Whether contract language was ambiguous requiring extrinsic evidence	Wavier language unclear about scope	Language clear and unambiguous; extrinsic evidence unnecessary	Contract terms unambiguous; extrinsic evidence not needed

Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28 (2001) (summary judgment standard; clarify movant’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law)
Harris v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 542 (1988) (exculpatory agreements against public policy factors)
White v. Village of Homewood, 256 Ill. App. 3d 354 (1993) (disparity in bargaining power; employment-like exculpatory restraint)
Platt v. Gateway International Motorsports Corp., 351 Ill. App. 3d 326 (2004) (exculpatory agreement as express assumption of risk; contract interpretation emphasis)
Evans v. Lima Lima Flight Team, Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 407 (2007) (scope of exculpatory clauses; foreseeability of danger)
Schlessman v. Henson, 83 Ill. 2d 82 (1980) (scope of exculpatory agreements; foreseeability and risk)
Hamer v. Segway Tours of Chicago, LLC, 402 Ill. App. 3d 42 (2010) (interpretation of exculpatory provisions; contract interpretation framework)
Joyce v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary LLP, 382 Ill. App. 3d 632 (2008) (contract interpretation; plain meaning governs)
Meyer v. Marilyn Miglin, Inc., 273 Ill. App. 3d 882 (1995) (unambiguous terms; contractual intent)
Williams v. Strickland, 837 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (beneficiary in rehabilitation program not an employee for FLSA; rehabilitation purpose)