Johnson v. Recca
807 N.W.2d 363
Mich. Ct. App.2011Background
- Plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck by defendant's vehicle; no-fault benefits and third-party damages are at issue.
- Plaintiff claimed replacement services expenses, including Harrietta Johnson's care, and alleged a serious impairment of body function.
- Lower court granted summary disposition to defendant on excess replacement-services damages and noneconomic damages; decision later appealed.
- First-party action against Allstate regarding replacement services was decided in plaintiff's favor on appeal; issues remained for third-party action.
- Court analyzes whether replacement-services expenses are within 'allowable expenses' and whether tort recovery is available for excess amounts
- McCormick decision and Kreiner framework govern interpretation of impairment threshold and recoverable economic losses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are replacement-services expenses within allowable expenses for no-fault recovery in a third-party action? | Replacement services are a category of allowable expenses under 3107(1)(l)(a). | Replacement services are separate from allowable expenses and limited by 3107(l)(c) with daily/3-year caps. | Replacement services are a category of allowable expenses. |
| May excess replacement-services expenses be recovered in a third-party action after 3 years? | Excess replacement-services expenses beyond 3 years are recoverable under 3135(3)(c). | Only within the statutory caps and not beyond the defined replacement-services limits. | Yes; excess replacement-services expenses may be recovered beyond daily/3-year limits. |
| Did plaintiff suffer a serious impairment of body function sufficient for noneconomic damages? | There is an objectively manifested impairment affecting normal life, supported by MRI evidence. | Medical records show no traumatic brain injury or lasting spinal damage; no impairment to normal life. | There is a genuine dispute; McCormick standards apply; reversed and remanded for further proceedings. |
| Should the McCormick standards for serious impairment govern the threshold inquiry on remand? | McCormick clarifies proper test and requires consideration of MRI evidence and preexisting conditions. | Preexisting conditions and conventional findings may preclude threshold impairment. | McCormick standards apply; case remanded for full application. |
| Does the trial court's collateral-estoppel reasoning affect replacement-services recoveries in the third-party action? | Collateral estoppel does not bar relitigation of replacement-services issues for excess damages. | Preclusion of issues already decided in first-party action may limit recovery. | Remand appropriate; issue unresolved at this stage; do not foreclose later determinations. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109 (Mich. 2004) (no-fault excess economic losses framework; replacement expenses discussed)
- Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 472 Mich 521 (Mich. 2005) (defines 'care' to include injury-related services; replacement services as 'care')
- McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (Mich. 2010) (redefines serious impairment of body function standard; applies new test)
- Swantek v Auto Club of Mich Ins Group, 118 Mich App 807 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (notes right to excess economic loss in categories with statutory caps)