Johnson v. O'Connor
115 N.E.3d 1062
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- Edward O’Connor applied to be a Chicago police officer and disclosed arrests for domestic battery in 2003 (against his mother) and 2014 (against a roommate/ex-girlfriend).
- CPD’s Special Order disqualifies applicants for conduct demonstrating a "propensity for violence," and mandates disqualification for felonies, misdemeanors within 3 years, or more than one misdemeanor in an applicant’s life.
- A CPD investigator recommended disqualification based on both incidents; DHR removed O’Connor from the eligibility list and he requested a Board hearing.
- The hearing officer found it was more likely than not O’Connor committed domestic battery in 2003 but not in 2014, and recommended reinstatement because a single old misdemeanor did not show a propensity for violence.
- The Human Resources Board adopted that recommendation and reinstated O’Connor; the CPD superintendent and City sought certiorari in circuit court, which reversed the Board. O’Connor appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Johnson's Argument | O'Connor's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Board misinterpreted CPD Special Order subsection (B)(2)(c) by holding one past misdemeanor cannot demonstrate a propensity for violence | The Special Order permits CPD discretion and its plain language allows a single violent act (even if old) to be disqualifying in appropriate circumstances | A single misdemeanor more than 3 years old cannot, as a matter of law, show propensity and thus cannot be the basis for disqualification | Held for Johnson: Board erred. The Special Order is discretionary; it does not categorically forbid disqualification based on a single older misdemeanor and CPD may consider aggravating circumstances |
| Standard of review for Board’s interpretation of the Special Order | De novo review is appropriate because the issue is one of law (interpretation of the Order) | Argued for a more deferential mixed-question standard (clearly erroneous) | Held de novo: interpretation of agency rule is a question of law, though agency interpretations enjoy a presumption of validity |
| Appropriate remedy after finding Board misapplied the Special Order | Remand to allow CPD to exercise its discretion considering only the 2003 incident | Urged reinstatement to eligibility list (as Board ordered) | Court remanded: CPD must determine whether the 2003 incident alone warrants discretionary disqualification; reversed Board and affirmed circuit court |
Key Cases Cited
- Applegate v. Department of Transportation, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1056 (procedural guidance on review when Administrative Review Law not adopted)
- Outcom, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 233 Ill. 2d 324 (writ of certiorari review compared to Administrative Review Law)
- People v. Bonutti, 212 Ill. 2d 182 (rules for construing administrative regulations like statutes)
- Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023 (plain-language rule and legislative intent in statutory construction)
- Walk v. Department of Children & Family Services, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1174 (agency interpretation of its rules enjoys presumption of validity)
- People v. Garstecki, 234 Ill. 2d 430 (interpretation of permissive language such as "may")