272 F. Supp. 3d 1168
N.D. Cal.2017Background
- Plaintiffs are owners/lessees of various Nissan models equipped with factory-installed panoramic sunroofs (models from 2008+), alleging the sunroofs spontaneously shatter/explode and that Nissan concealed the risk and refused adequate repair or compensation.
- At least 105 consumer complaints to NHTSA since 2008; plaintiffs allege Nissan knew of complaints by 2013 and failed to warn or disclose material safety information.
- Named plaintiffs: Sherida Johnson (purchased certified pre‑owned 2016 Maxima from CarMax) and Subrina Seenarain (purchased certified pre‑owned 2014 Maxima from a Nissan dealer); both experienced sunroof shattering and paid for repairs after being told warranty did not cover the damage.
- Plaintiffs assert multiple claims individually and on behalf of California, New York, and nationwide classes: MMWA, unjust enrichment, UCL, CLRA, Song‑Beverly, NY GBL §§349/350, breach of express and implied warranties, false advertising, and seek damages plus equitable relief and injunctive relief.
- Nissan moved to dismiss; the court granted in part and denied in part: dismissed nationwide class allegations for lack of standing and dismissed Johnson’s Song‑Beverly implied warranty claim; otherwise denied dismissal and gave leave to amend (20 days).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to pursue nationwide state‑law class claims | Named plaintiffs can plead nationwide class at pleading stage; standing established individually suffices | Named plaintiffs lack standing to assert other states' laws; choice‑of‑law concerns require representative(s) from those states | Dismiss nationwide class claims for lack of standing; plaintiffs may add adequate named plaintiffs and amend |
| Whether Nissan’s express warranty covers design defects | Plaintiffs contend warranty could cover design and manufacturing defects; allege manufacturing theory too | Nissan: warranty covers only "materials or workmanship," not design defects | Warranty language unambiguous: does not cover design defects; but plaintiffs plausibly pleaded a manufacturing defect theory so express warranty claim survives as to manufacturing defects |
| Sufficiency of express warranty allegations re: Seenarain’s vehicle warranty coverage | Plaintiffs allege vehicle was within warranty period | Nissan says no purchase date/mileage alleged to show warranty coverage | Allegation that vehicle was within warranty accepted at pleading stage; claim survives |
| Song‑Beverly implied warranty (Johnson, used car bought from CarMax) | Johnson asserts implied warranty despite buying used from reseller | Nissan: Song‑Beverly applies to new goods and creates obligations for distributors/retail sellers for used goods, not original manufacturer | Johnson’s Song‑Beverly implied warranty claim against Nissan dismissed with leave to amend (manufacturer not liable for used‑good implied warranty under statute) |
| New York implied warranty (Seenarain) / privity or third‑party beneficiary status | Seenarain: can recover as intended third‑party beneficiary of contracts between Nissan and dealers; warranty and post‑purchase actions create privity/benefit | Nissan: no privity; plaintiff not intended beneficiary; post‑purchase contacts do not create privity | No privity, but Seenarain plausibly alleged she is an intended third‑party beneficiary of dealer–manufacturer contracts; implied warranty claim survives |
| Consumer fraud/omission claims (UCL, CLRA, NY GBL §§349/350) | Plaintiffs allege Nissan concealed material safety risk and made misleading representations; omissions actionable even without direct transaction with Nissan | Nissan: plaintiffs bought from resellers, so cannot base omission claims on Nissan; also challenge causation and particularity under Rule 9(b) | Court: CLRA and UCL omission/fraud claims adequately pleaded (duty to disclose, materiality, likelihood of deception); NY GBL §349/350 claims adequately pleaded for Seenarain; Rule 9(b) nondisclosure theory met for California fraud prong |
| Equitable relief (restitution, disgorgement, injunction) | Plaintiffs may seek equitable relief tied to fraud/omission claims; repairs do not cure risk and fear of driving persists | Nissan: plaintiffs have adequate legal remedies and no irreparable harm (repairs performed) | Denied dismissal: equitable remedies permitted at this stage because fraud/omission claims survive and plaintiffs plausibly allege ongoing risk/irreparable injury |
Key Cases Cited
- Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (constitutional standing requires injury, causation, redressability)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6))
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading must permit reasonable inference of liability)
- Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012) (choice‑of‑law limits application of California law to nationwide classes)
- Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2015) (interpretation of "materials and workmanship" warranty language and ambiguity analysis)
- In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., 754 F.Supp.2d 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (distinguishing design vs. manufacturing defect claims in warranty context)
- Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal.3d 413 (Cal. 1978) (manufacturing vs. design defect definitions and the soda‑bottle example)