Johnson v. Montgomery (Slip Opinion), 2017 Ohio 7445

Background

Nichole Johnson was severely injured in a car crash caused by Mary Montgomery, who had just left The Living Room strip club intoxicated.
Montgomery worked as a dancer who leased stage space from Thirty-Eight Thirty, Inc.; she paid $30/night, kept tips, and received no wages from the club.
Drinking while working was common and encouraged; the club profited substantially from drinks purchased for dancers.
Johnson sued Montgomery (defaulted), Thirty-Eight Thirty, and its owner Ferraro for common-law negligence and under Ohio’s Dram Shop Act, R.C. 4399.18.
The trial court submitted the negligence claim to the jury (verdict for Johnson) but directed a verdict for the club and owner on the Dram Shop Act claim; the court of appeals held the Dram Shop Act provides the exclusive remedy and reversed the negligence judgment against the club.
The Ohio Supreme Court considered whether the Dram Shop Act’s term “intoxicated person” includes non‑patrons (e.g., workers/independent contractors) and whether the Act precludes common-law negligence claims here.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether “intoxicated person” in R.C. 4399.18 includes workers/independent contractors or only patrons	Johnson: term should be read to mean intoxicated patron; statute targets permit‑holder sales to customers	Thirty‑Eight Thirty: “person” is broad and includes dancers/workers/independent contractors	Held: “intoxicated person” includes any person (workers, independent contractors, dancers), not limited to patrons
Whether the Dram Shop Act is the exclusive remedy precluding common‑law negligence against a permit holder for off‑premises injuries	Johnson: club liable under common‑law negligence because Montgomery was a worker/contractor, not a patron	Defendants: Dram Shop Act governs and, when applicable, is the exclusive statutory scheme for off‑premises intoxication injuries	Held: When the Dram Shop Act applies it provides the exclusive remedy; common‑law negligence claim against the permit holder was precluded
Whether the club could be liable under the Dram Shop Act given statutory elements (sale to a noticeably intoxicated person or to an underage person)	Johnson: facts would permit a finding that Montgomery was noticeably intoxicated when served	Defendants: record shows magistrate found she was not noticeably intoxicated; statutory elements unmet	Held: Court accepted the magistrate’s unchallenged finding that Montgomery was not shown to be noticeably intoxicated, so Dram Shop liability did not attach on these facts
Whether courts should reframe statutory meaning based on policy/legislative history to limit coverage to patrons	Johnson: legislative history and public policy support narrowing statute to patrons	Defendants: plain statutory language controls; policy concerns are for the legislature	Held: Court applied plain meaning; did not rewrite statute for policy reasons

Key Cases Cited

Klever v. Canton Sachsenheim, Inc., 86 Ohio St.3d 419, 715 N.E.2d 536 (1999) (discussing scope and principles of Ohio Dram Shop Act)
Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp., 38 Ohio St.3d 69, 525 N.E.2d 1386 (1988) (statutory terms given plain, everyday meaning when undefined)
Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014) (courts must apply statute as written even if other approaches might accord with policy)
Badaracco v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 464 U.S. 386 (1984) (role limits of courts in rewriting statutes based on policy)
Gressman v. McClain, 40 Ohio St.3d 359, 533 N.E.2d 732 (1988) (Dram Shop Act purpose: duty to observe patrons’ intoxication)
Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 430 N.E.2d 935 (1982) (standard for directed verdict; court must not weigh evidence)
Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997) (plain‑error/exceptional‑circumstances standard)
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (duty defined by foreseeable risk)