Johnson v. Montgomery (Slip Opinion)
2017 Ohio 7445
| Ohio | 2017Background
- Car crash injured Nichole Johnson when Mary Montgomery—who had been working as a dancer at The Living Room strip club—drove home intoxicated and collided with Johnson’s vehicle.
- Montgomery admitted to using cocaine that day and drinking beers at work; the club’s business model encouraged dancers to drink and customers to buy drinks for them. Club owner testified a large portion of revenue derived from alcohol sales and dancers consumed 30–40% of alcohol sold.
- Montgomery leased space from the club and kept her tips; she was not an employee receiving wages from the club.
- Johnson sued Montgomery (default judgment entered), the club Thirty-Eight Thirty, Inc., and its owner Michael Ferraro for common-law negligence and, against the club and Ferraro, for violation of Ohio’s Dram Shop Act (R.C. 4399.18).
- At trial a magistrate directed a verdict for the club and Ferraro on the Dram Shop Act claim but allowed the common-law negligence claim to go to the jury; the jury returned a large verdict for Johnson on negligence. The Second District reversed the negligence verdict, holding the Dram Shop Act is the exclusive remedy when it applies.
- The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted discretionary review to decide whether the statutory phrase “intoxicated person” in the Dram Shop Act includes non-patrons such as workers or independent contractors (e.g., dancers).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “intoxicated person” in R.C. 4399.18 includes workers/independent contractors (dancers) or only patrons | Johnson: term should be read to mean intoxicated patron; Dram Shop Act therefore does not bar common-law negligence against the club for injuries caused by an intoxicated worker | Club: “person” is broad and includes any person served by the permit holder (patrons, workers, contractors); if the Act applies it is the exclusive remedy | Held: “person” means any person (includes workers/independent contractors); Dram Shop Act applies to such cases |
| Whether, given Dram Shop Act applies, common-law negligence claim remains available | Johnson: because dancer was not a patron, common-law negligence should apply | Club: when Dram Shop Act applies it precludes common-law negligence claims against permit holders for off-premises injuries | Held: When Dram Shop Act applies, it provides the exclusive cause of action for off-premises injuries caused by an intoxicated person |
| Whether the club or owner was liable under the Dram Shop Act on the record (i.e., whether they knowingly sold to a noticeably intoxicated person) | Johnson: evidence (Montgomery’s admission, business practice encouraging drinking) permitted a jury to find the club knowingly sold to a noticeably intoxicated person | Club: no evidence that staff knowingly sold alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated person; magistrate found no testimony of indicia of intoxication | Held: The trial court determined (unchallenged on appeal) Montgomery was not shown to have been noticeably intoxicated when served; therefore Dram Shop Act liability did not attach on the record |
| Whether appellate courts may construe statute narrowly based on policy or legislative history | Johnson: legislative history and policy against drunk driving support narrowing to patrons | Club: plain statutory language controls; courts must apply unambiguous statute as written | Held: Court applies plain meaning of unambiguous statute; policy arguments should be addressed to legislature |
Key Cases Cited
- Klever v. Canton Sachsenheim, Inc., 86 Ohio St.3d 419 (discussing Dram Shop Act and intoxicated person concept)
- Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp., 38 Ohio St.3d 69 (plain-meaning rule for undefined statutory terms)
- State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543 (same: when statute unambiguous, apply as written)
- Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 66 (standard for directed verdict; role of court vs. jury)
- Gressman v. McClain, 40 Ohio St.3d 359 (purpose of Dram Shop Act: duty to observe patron intoxication)
- Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 (plain-error exception and remedy for manifest miscarriage of justice)
- Palsgraf v. Long Island RR. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (duty defined by foreseeable risk)