Johnson v. Kansas Employment Security Board of Review, 330 P.3d 1128

Johnson concurrently held a full-time state computer programmer job and a part-time McDonald’s position, and began receiving unemployment benefits after separation from the state job in Sept 2011 while still working at McDonald’s.
Johnson properly reported McDonald’s wages to KDOL while collecting benefits related to the state job.
In Nov 2011 Johnson asked McDonald’s to stop scheduling him to pursue programming opportunities in San Diego; he later moved to California to seek work and education.
On Feb 5, 2012 Johnson formally resigned from McDonald’s; his last day of work there was in Nov 2011 and he claimed he moved to California for better opportunities.
KDOL examiner disqualified Johnson from benefits as of Feb 5, 2012 for leaving work voluntarily without good cause attributable to work or employer; referee upheld, Board affirmed.
District court reversed, holding that applying the voluntary departure disqualification to all benefits, including those from the state job, was too broad and inconsistent with the KESL.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 44-706(a) disqualifies all benefits for any voluntary departure	Johnson argues the clause disqualifies only benefits related to the left job, not those from the State job.	Board contends the statute bars all benefits if any job is left voluntarily without good cause.	Disqualification applies separately to each job; not all benefits are forfeited.
Whether statutory interpretation aligns with KESL public policy	Public policy favors protecting workers from economic insecurity; treating all benefits as lost is unreasonable.	Board's interpretation maintains a uniform rule for voluntary departures.	Board's interpretation is inconsistent with public policy and the statutory scheme; adopt per-job disqualification.

Tomlin v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 82 Cal. App. 3d 642 (Cal. App. 1978) (multijob scenarios create ambiguity in 'left work' statutes)
Sticka v. Holiday Village South, 348 N.W.2d 761 (Minn. 1984) (ambiguity when claimant holds multiple jobs)
Gilbert v. Hanlon, 214 Neb. 676, 335 N.W.2d 548 (Neb. 1983) (ambiguity in voluntary departure provisions with multiple jobs)
McCarthy v. Iowa Employment Sec. Comm., 247 Iowa 760, 764, 76 N.W.2d 201 (Iowa 1956) (statutory phrasing ambiguous with concurrent employment)
Emerson v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 393 Mass. 351, 471 N.E.2d 97 (Mass. 1984) (policy considerations in unemployment law interpretation)
Rodgers v. Dep't of Employment Security, 186 Ill. App. 3d 194, 542 N.E.2d 168 (Ill. App. 1989) (case addressing separate treatment of multiple employments)
Delhomme v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Com’n, 88 So.3d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (legislative history suggesting broader disqualification in some contexts)
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296 Kan. 906 (Kan. 2013) (reconciliation of statutory provisions in pari materia within KESL)
Baker v. Midway Enterprises, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 188 (Mo. App. 2002) (reasonableness of employment-security interpretations)
Goodman v. Board of Review, 245 N.J. Super. 551, 586 A.2d 313 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (comparable interpretation in other jurisdictions)