Johnson v. Johnson
19-1719
1st Cir.Jan 19, 2022Background
- On December 17, 2017 Horace (MA resident) drove with his cousin Carlton (RI resident) in Providence; both were seriously injured when the car struck a utility pole. Horace was insured by Arbella; the policy provided $100,000 bodily-injury coverage for guest occupants outside Massachusetts.
- On January 25, 2018 Carlton sent a written demand (citing RI law and Asermely) for the $100,000 policy limit; Arbella responded on February 28, 2018 accepting the demand.
- Carlton and his mother filed suit on March 6, 2018 (initially in RI state court, later removed). The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding an enforceable settlement existed and that R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.2 did not apply because no civil action had been commenced when Arbella accepted.
- Carlton appealed, raising: (1) § 27-7-2.2 applies (so late acceptance invalidates settlement); (2) alternatively, there was a meeting of the minds that a 30‑day deadline applied; and (3) insurer bad‑faith / unfair-practice claims under RI common law (Asermely) and MA G.L. c.93A survived.
- The First Circuit certified the statutory-definition question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court; that court held that "civil action" in § 27-7-2.2 means a judicial proceeding commenced by filing a complaint and required documents/fees.
- Applying that holding and reviewing other arguments (including waiver/new-theory rules and Chapter 93A demand requirements), the First Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the appellees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.2 applies to pre‑suit written settlement offers (definition of "civil action") | § 27-7-2.2 applies from accrual of a tort claim; the statute's 30‑day presumption governs pre‑suit demands and makes Arbella's late acceptance ineffective | § 27-7-2.2 requires an actual civil action to be pending; no complaint had been filed when Arbella accepted, so the statute is inapplicable and the settlement is valid | Rhode Island Supreme Court (certified) and First Circuit: "civil action" means a judicial proceeding commenced by filing a complaint and required documents/fees; statute did not apply, settlement enforceable |
| Whether there was a mutual agreement (meeting of the minds) that a 30‑day deadline governed the offer | Carlton: even if § 27-7-2.2 doesn’t apply, the demand and correspondence manifested a mutual 30‑day deadline revoking the offer if not timely accepted | Arbella: no contract term or communications established a 30‑day contractual deadline; no supporting facts or law | Court: argument was raised for the first time on appeal (not preserved); no record support; rejected |
| Whether insurer bad‑faith / unfair‑practice claims under RI Asermely and MA c.93A survive summary judgment | Carlton: Arbella acted in bad faith and failed to follow insurer duties; his January 25 letter also served as a Chapter 93A pre‑suit demand | Arbella: Asermely-based claim lacks record support; Chapter 93A requires a written pre‑suit demand meeting specific content requirements which Carlton’s letter did not satisfy | Court: Asermely claim not establishable on record/waived; Chapter 93A demand deficient (no reference to 93A, unfair practice, treble damages, or 30‑day settlement demand); summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Johnson, 952 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2020) (First Circuit certified the statutory-definition question to the Rhode Island Supreme Court)
- Brader v. Biogen Inc., 983 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2020) (standards for reviewing summary judgment)
- Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1999) (Rhode Island recognition of insurer duties in settlement negotiations)
- DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585 (R.I. 2011) (Rhode Island precedent discussing insurer settlement handling)
- Summit Ins. Co. v. Stricklett, 199 A.3d 523 (R.I. 2019) (Rhode Island cases involving pre‑suit settlement offers)
- Cassano v. Gogos, 480 N.E.2d 649 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (enumerating requirements for a Chapter 93A pre‑suit demand letter)
- Passatempo v. McMenimen, 960 N.E.2d 275 (Mass. 2012) (endorsing Cassano test for 93A demands)
- Gore v. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co., 932 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (example of demand satisfying 30‑day policy‑limit demand requirement)
