Johnson v. Gentry
4:14-cv-00395-CWD
| D. Idaho | Sep 18, 2019Background
- Petitioner Sarah Johnson (age 16 at offense) was convicted of murdering her parents with a .264 high‑power rifle and sentenced to two fixed life terms plus a 15‑year firearm enhancement; she has served ~16 years in IDOC custody.
- Physical evidence: pink bathrobe with blood and gloves in trash, gloves with gunshot residue, blood/tissue found in hallway and Sarah’s bedroom, limited/no blood on Sarah’s hair/face; unidentified DNA mixtures and unidentified fingerprints on the rifle/scope/ammo box later matched (post‑trial) to Christopher Hill.
- Procedural history: trial conviction (2005); counsel failed to timely appeal but appeal reinstated; state post‑conviction litigation, successive petitions, and denials; petitioner sought further DNA testing and raised numerous federal claims in this federal habeas petition.
- Petitioner asserted claims including juror bias (Claim One), multiple ineffective‑assistance claims (Claims Three–Five), Brady failure to disclose post‑trial fingerprint match (Claim Six), and sought limited discovery/testing to establish actual innocence to overcome procedural default.
- District court denied petitioner’s discovery request and request to retest DNA (finding no plausible actual‑innocence gateway), appointed counsel prospectively, dismissed Claims One and Six with prejudice, and conditionally granted partial dismissal of Claims Three–Five on procedural‑default grounds but ordered briefing on the merits of remaining claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juror 85 (Claim One): juror inability to follow instructions | Juror said he might not be able to disregard evidence; Johnson argues due process and Sixth Amendment violation | State: counsel waived further questioning; no clear inability to follow instructions; harmless | Denied on the merits; claim dismissed with prejudice (no prejudice; waiver/deference to trial court) |
| Ineffective assistance (Claims Three, Four, Five) and procedural default | Johnson seeks to invoke Martinez excuse and Martinez/constitutional review of IAC claims | State: claims were withdrawn or procedurally defaulted under Idaho law (Murphy), so barred | Court conditionally grants partial summary dismissal on procedural‑default grounds but will reach merits briefing now; ordered parties to brief specified subclaims |
| Brady claim re: post‑trial fingerprint match (Claim Six) | Johnson: suppression of exculpatory evidence (match to Christopher Hill) denied fair trial | State: match occurred post‑trial (2007/2009); prosecution did not possess/misplace match at trial, so Brady inapplicable | Denied on the merits; claim dismissed with prejudice (evidence discovered after trial, not withheld at trial) |
| Motion for limited discovery / DNA retesting to show actual innocence | Johnson requests retesting/deposition to develop Schlup/House actual‑innocence gateway and excuse defaults | State: additional testing unlikely to produce evidence that would make acquittal more likely; findings of state courts significant; fishing expedition | Denied: court applies Schlup/House standard, finds discovery/speculation insufficient to meet actual‑innocence standard |
| Appointment of counsel for discovery/briefing | Johnson sought counsel to assist with discovery/pleadings | State did not oppose appointment in part | Granted prospectively: attorney Dennis Benjamin appointed to assist with briefing of remaining claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller is retroactive and binding on states)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (narrowly permits excuse of procedural default for IAC in initial‑review collateral proceedings under limited circumstances)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose materially exculpatory evidence)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (failure to preserve potentially useful evidence requires bad faith to violate due process)
- House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (standard for actual‑innocence gateway; probabilistic determination whether reasonable jurors would acquit)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (actual‑innocence gateway is demanding; evidence must show it is more likely than not no reasonable juror would convict)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (standard for juror disqualification for bias)
- Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007) (trial court entitled to deference based on juror demeanor and voir dire context)
- O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (exhaustion requires presentation of claims to state’s highest court)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default rules and failure to raise claims in state court)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard under Brady)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady components and materiality analysis)