Johnson v. Colvin, 2:15-cv-07929

Background

Plaintiff Julie Ann Johnson applied for SSI alleging depression, anxiety, migraines, partial blindness and hypertension; SSA denied benefits and ALJ issued an adverse decision covering June 14, 2011 through January 14, 2014.
ALJ found severe impairments: vision impairment, migraine headaches, major depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder; RFC: full range of exertional work with nonexertional limits (no climbing; occasional balance/stoop/crouch/kneel/crawl; avoid hazards; simple repetitive tasks; occasional interaction).
Consultative examiner Lester Sargent, M.A., found marked limitations in complex reasoning, responding to routine workplace changes, and severe defects in concentration/short-term memory; opined poor prognosis.
State agency consultants (Drs. Roman, Comer, Auvenshine) generally assessed only mild-to-moderate limitations and supported ability to perform simple repetitive work; ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Auvenshine and little weight to Sargent.
Plaintiff argued ALJ improperly discounted Sargent’s opinion without adequate explanation; vocational expert testified that adopting Sargent’s limitations would preclude substantial gainful employment.
District court reversed and remanded, holding the ALJ’s explanation for discounting Sargent’s opinions was conclusory, failed to identify the objective record evidence undermining those opinions, and inadequately addressed concentration/persistence/pace limitations.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ALJ properly weighed consultative examiner Lester Sargent’s mental opinion	ALJ gave "little weight" to Sargent without reasonable justification and should have inquired further if unclear; Sargent’s limitations, if adopted, are work-preclusive	ALJ permissibly discounted Sargent because his exam findings were not corroborated by objective evidence and other treating/consulting opinions	Court held ALJ erred: reasoning was perfunctory, failed to specify what objective evidence contradicted Sargent, and did not adequately address concentration/persistence/pace; remand required
Whether ALJ accounted for concentration, persistence, and pace limitations in RFC	Sargent found severe concentration deficits; limiting to simple, repetitive tasks does not necessarily account for these deficits	ALJ implicitly accounted for concentration deficits by restricting to simple repetitive tasks and citing other opinions and treatment records	Court held this was insufficient under Mascio: the ALJ failed to explicitly assess these limitations and must do so on remand
Whether ALJ permissibly rejected parts of Sargent’s opinion as "vague"	Sargent’s report and SSA form were sufficiently specific; rejecting them as vague was improper	ALJ found some of Sargent’s marked limitations vague and inconsistent with record	Court held rejection as "vague" unsupported: Sargent used SSA-approved forms and provided explanatory bases; ALJ’s characterization unsound
Whether any error was harmless given other medical opinions and VE testimony	Plaintiff argued error was not harmless because VE said Sargent’s limitations would preclude work	Defendant argued other opinions and claimant activities support ALJ’s RFC so error harmless	Court found error not harmless because VE testified Sargent’s limitations were work-preclusive; remand required

Key Cases Cited

Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453 (4th Cir.) (standard for substantial evidence review)
Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1973) (definition of substantial evidence)
McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1983) (five-step sequential evaluation / burden shifting)
Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015) (limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace require specific analysis beyond a restriction to simple tasks)
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585 (4th Cir. 1996) (review scope: no de novo factfinding)
Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650 (4th Cir. 2005) (court’s role limited to whether ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence)
Fox v. Colvin, [citation="632 F. App'x 750"] (4th Cir. 2015) (ALJ must explain why medical opinions are discounted to permit meaningful review)