Johnson v. Bryson
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40973
S.D.N.Y.2012Background
- Plaintiffs allege Census Bureau racially discriminatory background checks for 2010 census temporary hires under Title VII, focusing on the 30-day Letter demanding official court documentation and the Adjudication Criteria used to screen applicants.
- Background checks screened nearly all applicants via FBI records; 700k received 30-day Letters, ~93% failed to provide documentation or fingerprints.
- Some who complied were excluded by the Adjudication Criteria even without convictions or for old/minor offenses.
- Original Plaintiffs (Johnson, Houser, Gonzalez, Riesco, Daniels) had surviving individual claims; Rickett-Samuels and Anderson were dismissed; New Plaintiffs (Scott, Kargbo, Desphy) join via Second Amended Complaint.
- Court first denied Census Bureau’s motion to dismiss injunctive/declaratory relief and granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs’ motion to amend, addressing standing, mootness, ripeness, and class-action contours.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing and mootness for injunctive relief | Plaintiffs had standing when suit began and claims remain live. | Plaintiffs lack imminent risk of recurrence; mootness applies as 2020 policies not yet implemented. | Plaintiffs have standing; claims not moot. |
| Ripeness and policy recurrence for injunctive relief | Policies could recur with future censuses; not ripe to dismiss. | Changes for 2020 show no recurrence of old policy. | Claims ripe; not moot. |
| Amendment and addition of New Plaintiffs; treatment of Dismissed Plaintiffs | Amendment should be permitted to add New Plaintiffs and resurrect class claims. | Amendment may be futile and venue issues; some claims barred by exhaustion. | Amendment granted in part; New Plaintiffs allowed; Anderson’s claims denied; Rickett-Samuels permitted. |
| Exhaustion and piggybacking under class regulations | Single filing rule allows piggybacking on Houser/Rickett-Samuels to pursue class claims. | Some plaintiffs lacked proper timely EEO filings; exhaustion requirements strict. | Rickett-Samuels’ claims granted to amend; Anderson’s claims denied for lack of piggyback base. |
| Venue and transfer questions | New Plaintiffs’ claims should not be barred by venue; transfer inappropriate. | Improper venue concerns may apply to New Plaintiffs; transfer to Maryland warranted. | Census waived improper venue for Dismissed and New Plaintiffs; transfer denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (establishes three standing elements; injury, causation, redressability)
- City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (standing requires likelihood of future harm; not merely speculative)
- Nevada v. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (ripeness and pre-enforcement review; caution against premature adjudication)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (class certification standards post-Wal-Mart; distinguish Rule 23(b)(2) vs (b)(3))
- Lanehart v. Devine, 102 F.R.D. 592 (D. Md. 1984) (waiver of venue defense for subsequently named plaintiffs; Rule 12(h) timing)