Johnson v. BOKF National Assn, 15 F.4th 356

Plaintiff Sharonda Johnson held a BOKF checking account and overdrew the account in 2016; BOKF paid the item, charged a $32.50 initial overdraft fee, then charged $6.50 per business day in "Extended Overdraft Charges" after a five-business-day cure period.
Johnson was charged $45.50 in Extended Overdraft Charges for one incident and sued in a putative class action, alleging those daily charges are "interest" under § 85 of the National Bank Act (NBA) and therefore usurious under state-law caps incorporated by the NBA.
BOKF’s deposit agreement treats returned-item and initial overdraft fees identically ($32.50); Extended Overdraft Charges apply only if the customer fails to timely repay the overdraft.
The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, concluding the fees are not "interest" under the NBA; Johnson appealed.
The Fifth Circuit held OCC Interpretive Letter 1082—classifying similar continuous/sustained overdraft fees as non‑interest deposit account service charges under 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002—was entitled to Auer/Kisor deference; therefore the fees are not "interest" under § 85 and are not subject to NBA usury limits.
The court also affirmed denial of further discovery because Johnson’s complaint failed to plead a plausible claim under Twombly/Iqbal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a bank makes a "loan" (or extends credit) when it pays a customer’s overdraft such that subsequent fees can be "interest" under § 85 of the NBA	Johnson: Paying an overdraft is an extension of credit; Extended Overdraft Charges compensate for forbearance/use of money and thus are "interest."	BOKF: Paying/covering overdrafts and charging sustained fees are deposit account services, not loans or interest governed by § 85.	Held: Court deferred to OCC—overdraft/extended overdraft fees are non‑interest deposit account service charges, not "interest."
Whether OCC’s Interpretive Letter 1082 (classifying continuous overdraft fees as non‑interest) is entitled to deference	Johnson: Letter is not binding and does not directly interpret § 7.4001(a); cannot preclude her statutory claim.	BOKF: OCC’s letter interprets its regulations and is a reasonable, authoritative agency position deserving Auer/Kisor deference.	Held: Regulations are genuinely ambiguous; Letter 1082 is reasonable, authoritative, within OCC expertise, and entitled to Auer/Kisor deference.
Whether dismissal without additional discovery was improper because factual disputes exist	Johnson: She should be allowed discovery to prove the fees function as interest/are loans.	BOKF: Complaint fails to state a plausible claim under Rule 8; discovery is unwarranted.	Held: Dismissal affirmed—pleading was implausible under Twombly/Iqbal, so discovery not required.

Smiley v. Citibank, N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (courts defer to OCC interpretation of "interest" under the NBA)
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (standards and limits for deferring to agency interpretation of its own regulations)
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (NBA governs national banks and OCC administers the statute)
Fawcett v. Citizens Bank, N.A., 919 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2019) (overdraft/sustained fees characterized as non‑interest under OCC regs)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard requiring plausible claim)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility requirement for complaints)
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980) (agency staff memoranda can receive deference)