Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District
724 F.3d 1159
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- Early 2009 on a Fruitvale Platform, a group including Grant and five friends were detained after a fight; Mehserle, Pirone, and Domenici detained and handcuffed the group overnight following Grant’s shooting, while Grant, Jr. asserted a Fourteenth Amendment claim for loss of familial relationship.
- Grant, via his father, asserted a Fourteenth Amendment claim on loss of companionship; Mehserle challenged on qualified immunity grounds.
- District court analyzed three time periods: initial detention, arrest command, and extended detentions at BART HQ; it denied immunity for some claims and granted immunity for others.
- Mehserle’s interlocutory appeal focused on (i) Grant, Jr.’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, (ii) California Civil Code §52.1 claim, (iii) Anicete’s unlawful arrest, (iv) extended-detentions claims, and (v) Jack Bryson’s unlawful arrest; Pirone and Domenici appeals were consolidated.
- Court undertook de novo review of immunity, viewing disputed facts in plaintiffs’ favor, and remanded where needed; it affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the district court’s determinations.
- The opinion emphasizes that a district court may not rely solely on disputed facts to deny immunity and that Dubner-based reasoning was improper for certain detentions; it schedules remand for additional fact-finding on Mehserle’s involvement in extended detentions and Domenici’s immunity, while affirming some immunity determinations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mehserle violated Grant, Jr.’s Fourteenth Amendment right to familial companionship | Grant, Jr. argues Mehserle deprived him of familial companionship. | Mehserle contends the right is not violated or lacks protection under qualified immunity. | Mehserle not entitled to immunity; district court’s denial affirmed. |
| Whether Mehserle is entitled to California Civil Code § 52.1 immunity | Plaintiffs argue Mehserle’s §52.1 claim overlaps with §1983 claims. | Qualified immunity applies to federal claims; state-law immunity not reviewable here. | Lack of jurisdiction to review; §52.1 immunity not reviewed on appeal; dismissed. |
| Whether Mehserle is immune from Anicete’s unlawful arrest claim | Anicete asserts Mehserle unlawfully arrested him. | Mehserle played no role in Anicete’s arrest. | Mehserle entitled to qualified immunity for Anicete’s unlawful arrest claim. |
| Whether Pirone’s detention of Reyes and Brysons constituted an unlawful arrest or prolonged detention | Pirone detained group for a misdemeanor; detention may become an arrest. | Pirone lacked sufficient grounds for detaining; disputed facts and scope warrant jury consideration. | Pirone not entitled to immunity for detention; jury to decide unlawful detention/arrest questions. |
| Whether Domenici’s immunity from extended-detention claims should be reviewed | Domenici’s presence shown in video suggests involvement in detentions. | Immunity should bar claims if not involved; Dubner-based analysis misapplied. | Remand; district court to reevaluate immunity with correct standard; appellate review limited; jurisdictional limits retained. |
Key Cases Cited
- Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2008) (parental Fourteenth Amendment right to companionship preserved unless terminated by adulthood or other factors)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (two-step qualified immunity framework; balance of interests)
- Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (interlocutory review limits on qualified immunity; district court errors on state-law immunity)
- Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2001) (burden-shifting on probable cause when arresting officers cannot identify who acted; improper reliance)
- Grigg v. United States, 498 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2007) (misdemeanor-detention standards; investigatory stops require reasonable suspicion; ongoing danger not shown in some contexts)
- Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000 (en banc)) (race as factor in reasonable suspicion; should be considered in totality of circumstances)