Johnson v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit
2012 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 329
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2012Background
- Johnson, convicted of felony voluntary manslaughter in 1983, was hired by AIU as a van driver after his conviction fell outside the five-year disqualifying window; Act 24 later made the five-year ban a lifetime ban via 24 P.S. § 1-111(e)(1).
- Act 24 amendments and PDE guidance extended the disqualifying standards to current employees and required reporting of convictions; AIU notified Johnson of termination under the lifetime ban and suspended him with pay following a pre-termination hearing.
- Johnson sought declaratory and injunctive relief arguing (i) due process violation under Article I, Section 1 for lack of rational relation to present duties, (ii) retroactive impairment of employment rights, and (iii) Ex Post Facto violation; the trial court granted a permanent injunction.
- The Department moved to intervene; trial court found Ex Post Facto violation and issued a permanent injunction; Department appeals challenging Ex Post Facto ruling but not the initial injunction posture.
- Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviews de novo the constitutionality of a statute; the statute is presumed valid unless clearly unconstitutional; issues can be facial or as-applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ex Post Facto violation | Johnson argues §1-111(e)(1) is punitive and retroactive, increasing punishment for past conduct. | Department contends the statute is civil, with a rational non-punitive purpose to protect students. | Ex Post Facto claim rejected on the specific issue; court upholds civil purpose but proceeds to substantive due process analysis. |
| Substantive due process under Article I, Section 1 | Johnson contends the lifetime ban based on a remote conviction is irrational and unrelated to present duties. | Department argues regulation of school-employment qualifications is a valid public interest. | Statute violates substantive due process as applied because remote conduct bears no rational relation to Johnson’s present ability to perform his role. |
| Rational basis and use of seven-factor test | Court applies seven-factor test; finds the lifetime ban lacks rational relation to protecting children and is excessive for Johnson’s current duties. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police, 576 Pa. 365, 839 A.2d 265 (Pa. 2003) (two-part ex post facto framework; civil/punitive purpose assessment)
- Nixon v. Department of Public Welfare (Nixon II), 576 Pa. 385, 839 A.2d 277 (Pa. 2003) (substantive due process in social/economic regulation; rational basis scrutiny)
- Nixon v. Department of Public Welfare (Nixon I), 789 A.2d 376 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001) (older adults protective services act; remote convictions unconstitutional as applied)
- John’s Vending Corp. v. City of Pittsburgh, 453 Pa. 488, 309 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1973) (remoteness of conduct; public employment restrictions must relate to present qualifications)
- Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 101 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1954) (rational basis scrutiny under substantive due process)
- Galena v. Department of State Professional and Occupational Affairs, 551 A.2d 679 (Pa. 1988) (automatic suspension as regulation of profession, not punishment)
- De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S. Ct. 1146 (U.S. 1960) (public-regulation rationale for disqualifications in public trust roles)