Johnson, Joe Dale, PD-1496-14

Background

Joe Dale Johnson, a convicted sex offender, was accused of aggravated sexual assault of a 12-year-old boy (H.H.) based on grooming, sexual propositions, and digital/oral sexual acts; the jury convicted and imposed life sentences after a prior Kansas-sex-offense enhancement was proven.
H.H. disclosed Johnson’s abuse in November 2007. Months later (May–July 2008) H.H. was charged and adjudicated for sexually abusing his sister; juvenile probation ended in July 2010, before the 2011 trial.
At trial Johnson advanced a fabrication/retaliation defense — arguing H.H. lied because he was angry over Johnson donating a Nintendo DS to the church — and extensively cross-examined H.H. on anger, counseling, shoplifting, and pornography.
Defense sought to introduce H.H.’s juvenile misconduct/adjudication; the trial court excluded it. The Second Court of Appeals initially reversed on an ‘‘open-door/false-impression’’ theory but, on en banc rehearing, the court reversed that memorandum opinion and affirmed exclusion and the conviction.
The State’s merits brief argues: (1) Johnson waived open-door/false-impression grounds by not presenting them at the admissibility hearing; (2) Johnson was able to develop a fabrication defense; (3) no logical nexus tied H.H.’s juvenile misconduct to particularized bias (motive/means/knowledge/opportunity), so exclusion was proper; (4) voir dire and opening statements did not create a false impression; and (5) Irby concerns about probation influence do not apply because H.H.’s probation had ended.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Johnson)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether Johnson preserved open-door/false-impression theories for admitting H.H.’s juvenile misconduct	Johnson contends prosecutor’s voir dire/opening/testimony left a false impression that opened the door to juvenile misconduct evidence	State: Johnson never timely presented those open-door/false-impression grounds at the admissibility hearing, so they are waived	Waived — trial record shows Johnson did not raise these theories below; appellate review of them is barred
Whether exclusion of juvenile misconduct impaired Johnson’s ability to present a fabrication defense	Johnson says cross‑examination was eviscerated and fabrication theory depended on showing H.H.’s juvenile misconduct	State: Record shows Johnson developed and argued fabrication via voir dire, opening, cross‑examination, and closing without needing juvenile adjudication evidence	Rejected — court finds defendant meaningfully developed fabrication theory without juvenile adjudication evidence
Whether juvenile misconduct was admissible because it bore a logical nexus to fabrication (motive/means/knowledge/opportunity)	Johnson argues the longstanding abuse of his sister provided motive/means/knowledge/opportunity to fabricate against Johnson	State: No evidence connected the sister‑abuse to Johnson; jury already heard relevant facts (anger, knowledge that accusations have consequences, pornography) so juvenile act added nothing particularized	Excluded — no logical nexus; juvenile misconduct was irrelevant or improper general impeachment and barred under rules and policy protecting juvenile records
Whether prosecutor’s voir dire or opening created a false impression justifying admission of juvenile misconduct	Johnson claims voir dire and opening suggested H.H. was naïve/innocent and therefore opened the door	State: Voir dire questions were general, permissible to govern peremptory use; opening statements accurately reflected elements/expected evidence and did not create a false impression	Rejected — questions/statements were general and borne out by trial evidence; no false impression that would open the door
Whether Irby concerns (probationary influence) permit admission of juvenile adjudication	Johnson relies on Irby dissent concerns about State influence via juvenile probation to justify admission	State: H.H.’s probation was discharged well before trial and outcry preceded adjudication; Appellant conceded no ongoing State influence	Inapplicable — no ongoing probationary relationship at trial; Irby dissent concerns do not apply

Key Cases Cited

Irby v. State, 327 S.W.3d 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Confrontation Clause and limits on use of juvenile adjudications; discussion of particular bias vs general impeachment)
Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (preservation requirement: party must timely state specific grounds for admission to preserve complaint)
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1974) (limits on impeachment through juvenile records under the Confrontation Clause)
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (harm analysis for jury-charge error — cited generally for standards)
Messenger v. State, 638 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (recognizing dissimilarities between adult and child sexual offenses for admissibility purposes)
Lee v. State, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (peremptory/voir dire and commitment question standards)