Johnny Timpson v. Anderson County Disabilities
31 F.4th 238
4th Cir.
2022

Background

  • Johnny Timpson, born with severe intellectual disabilities and cerebral palsy, lived in state-run and Board-operated group homes; he exhibited problematic behaviors and was transferred to his sister Sandra's care in August 2013 after she obtained health-care power of attorney.
  • In May 2013 staff at Tiny Greer found burns on Johnny’s wrists; Sandra believed they were serious and reported incidents to police; the Board maintained injuries were self-inflicted.
  • Sandra alleges she was not informed of feasible Medicaid waiver alternatives (including use of non‑DDSN providers or payment for family caregivers) and that the Board/DDSN withheld or delayed services in retaliation for her complaints.
  • The Timpsons sued multiple individuals and agencies alleging SCTCA negligence, ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations, APA claims, and § 1983 claims based on Medicaid/waiver administration; many claims were dismissed on summary judgment or directed verdict; limited claims proceeded to trial and the jury ruled for Defendants.
  • On appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded—most notably: it held the district court erred in applying South Carolina’s Human Affairs Law one‑year limitations period to certain ADA/RA claims and remanded limited retaliation claims by Sandra; it affirmed evidentiary rulings, SCTCA jury instructions, dismissal of most ADA/RA and § 1983 claims, and that state agencies are not § 1983 persons.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Applicable statute of limitations for ADA/RA claims ADA/RA claims should use a limitations period other than the SC Human Affairs Law one‑year period; discovery rule should toll limitations District court applied SC Human Affairs Law one‑year period and extended via § 15‑3‑40 for Johnny Court: district court erred; ADA/RA claims alleging discrimination in public services are analogous to general civil actions (three‑year period). Vacated in part and remanded for Sandra’s specified retaliation claims (2013–2015). Discovery rule argument not shown to prejudice; otherwise affirmed.
Limitation/exclusion of testimony: Johnny’s competency and hybrid witnesses Limiting Johnny’s testimony and excluding hybrid expert testimony prejudiced plaintiffs Trial court limited Johnny to basic testimony for competency and excluded hybrid experts under Rule 26 for inadequate disclosures and lack of factual basis Court: no abuse of discretion. Competency hearing supported limits; plaintiffs showed no prejudice and failed to satisfy Rule 26(a)(2)(C)(ii) and 26(a)(2)(B).
Deposing then‑Governor Nikki Haley Plaintiffs sought Haley’s deposition to probe personal liability and knowledge Gov. Haley (and court) argued she lacked personal involvement in Johnny’s care and depositions of high‑ranking officials should be limited Court: district court reasonably required interrogatories first and denied deposition; no error.
SCTCA standard of care and agency liability Plaintiffs argued Madison created a ‘‘reasonable care’’ standard displacing gross negligence and that DDSN could be liable for Board employees Defendants relied on SCTCA §15‑78‑60(25) (patient custody exception) and case law that Board is separate from DDSN Court: affirmed. Gross negligence is required under SCTCA exceptions; Madison did not remove gross‑negligence requirement. DDSN not vicariously liable for Board employees per state law.
ADA/RA merits and Olmstead claim Plaintiffs argued denial of integrated services and misallocation of funds violated ADA/RA and Olmstead Defendants argued no showing that state assessments or funding decisions unlawfully denied Johnny community habilitation; plaintiffs failed to tie conduct to statutory violations Court: plaintiffs’ briefs and record failed to identify specific unlawful acts or injury; dismissal affirmed. Olmstead does not impose an entitlement to particular medical/service levels absent other proof.
§ 1983 supervisory liability and state‑entity liability Plaintiffs alleged supervisory policymakers (governors, agency heads) liable for system‑wide customs and decisions Defendants argued Monell bars respondeat superior and plaintiffs offered no evidence of personal involvement or pervasive unconstitutional policy Court: affirmed dismissal. Plaintiffs failed to plead or prove supervisory personal involvement or pervasive practices; states and state officials in official capacity are not "persons" under § 1983.

Key Cases Cited

  • Mowbray v. Kozlowski, 914 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1990) (Medicaid is cooperative federal‑state program administered by state agency)
  • Wolsky v. Med. Coll. of Hampton Roads, 1 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 1993) (state statute of limitations should be for the most analogous state claim)
  • Semenova v. Maryland Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564 (4th Cir. 2017) (when state antidiscrimination law lacks public‑services remedy, general civil action limitations period is the closer analog)
  • Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (ADA requires services in most integrated setting appropriate, but not a federal entitlement to particular level of medical services)
  • Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; municipal liability requires policy/custom causing constitutional injury)
  • Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984) (standards for supervisory liability under § 1983 and need for pervasive evidence)
  • Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir. 1994) (elements of supervisory § 1983 liability)
  • Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (states and state officials acting in official capacity are not "persons" under § 1983)
  • Etheredge v. Richland Sch. Dist. One, 534 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2000) (definition of gross negligence under SCTCA)
  • Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc., 638 S.E.2d 650 (S.C. 2006) (DDSN owes duty of reasonable care but SCTCA exceptions still apply; gross negligence remains the exception standard)
  • Young v. S.C. Dep’t of Disabilities & Special Needs, 649 S.E.2d 488 (S.C. 2007) (Board is separate entity from DDSN; nondelegable duty doctrine does not impose vicarious liability)
  • Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013) (ADA and Rehabilitation Act impose similar integration requirements)
  • Wolsky and Semenova interplay cited to determine appropriate limitations period for ADA/RA claims
  • Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 849 F.3d 355 (7th Cir. 2017) (limits on hybrid fact/expert witness testimony)
  • Downey v. Bob’s Disc. Furniture Holdings, Inc., 633 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (hybrid witnesses treated as fact witnesses when opinions arise from direct involvement)
  • Odom, United States v., 736 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1984) (trial court’s discretion on witness competency)
  • Nicholas v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 373 F.3d 537 (4th Cir. 2004) (no reversible error absent substantial prejudice from evidentiary ruling)
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