312 So.3d 826
Fla.2019Background
- In December 2010 Mia Chay Brown was kidnapped from Johnny Mack Sketo Calhoun’s trailer; her burned car and body were found days later in Geneva County, Alabama. Witnesses saw Calhoun at an Alabama convenience store the morning after with scratches and dried blood; items and DNA linking Brown and Calhoun were recovered from his trailer.
- Calhoun was convicted of first‑degree murder and kidnapping; jury recommended death (9–3). This Court affirmed on direct appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
- Calhoun filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 postconviction motion; after an evidentiary hearing the circuit court denied guilt‑phase claims but vacated the death sentence for Hurst error and ordered a new penalty phase.
- Postconviction claims on appeal challenged (inter alia) newly discovered evidence implicating Doug Mixon (testimony from Vermillion and Simmons), multiple ineffective assistance of trial counsel (investigation, experts, witness handling), Brady/Giglio violations, a conflict‑of‑interest claim, motions to amend/reopen, and the court’s use of the State’s written argument in its order.
- The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Calhoun’s guilt‑phase and other postconviction claims and denied his habeas petition asserting ineffective appellate counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Calhoun's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Newly discovered evidence implicating Doug Mixon | Testimony from Vermillion and Simmons shows Mixon likely killed Brown and entitles Calhoun to a new trial | The statements are hearsay or unreliable; even if admissible, they do not overcome the overwhelming evidence against Calhoun | Denied — evidence had admissibility/credibility problems and would not probably produce acquittal |
| IAC — failure to investigate Mixon’s alibi (Contreras) | Trial counsel should have interviewed Contreras and used his statements to impeach Mixon | Contreras’s statements were false/inadmissible hearsay; counsel’s failure was not deficient or prejudicial | Denied — no deficiency or no reasonable probability of different verdict |
| IAC — failure to retain forensic experts (pathologist; digital forensics) | Experts would have undermined State’s timeline and injury inferences | Counsel reasonably declined expert testimony as strategic; postconviction experts gave at best cumulative or non‑conclusive opinions | Denied — no deficient performance or no prejudice |
| IAC — handling of multiple trial witnesses | Counsel failed to object, investigate, impeach, or cross‑examine key witnesses (12 identified) | Many alleged errors were strategic, speculative, or would be cumulative; no reasonable probability of different outcome | Denied — strategic decisions and lack of prejudice given overwhelming evidence |
| Conflict of interest re: Public Defender’s office | An attorney in the office knew the victim; entire office was disqualified and Calhoun was deprived of conflict‑free counsel | The attorney’s recusal was based on limited personal contact; remaining counsel had no actual conflict | Denied — no actual conflict shown under Cuyler; no adverse effect on performance |
| Brady — suppression of Simmons’ purported report to Sheriff Ward | State failed to disclose Simmons’ report implicating Mixon | Evidence supports circuit court finding Simmons did not provide the information; nothing was suppressed | Denied — failure to satisfy Brady suppression/materiality prongs |
| Giglio/Napue — false testimony and misleading closing | Prosecution knowingly used or did not correct false testimony (Raley; Bradley) and misled jury in closings | Testimony was not false; closing argument advanced reasonable inferences from evidence; claims were also procedurally barred | Denied — procedurally barred and merits fail (no false testimony; harmless) |
| Motions to amend/reopen evidentiary hearing & court’s use of State’s written arguments | Court abused discretion in denying late amendments/reopen and violated due process by adopting State’s briefing | Court gave Calhoun opportunity to present Vermillion, will consider other alleged confessions in pending successive motion; adopting State’s arguments in order did not deny process | Denied — no abuse of discretion and no due‑process violation |
| Habeas — ineffective appellate counsel | Appellate counsel omitted challenges (rule‑of‑completeness admission, venue/jurisdiction instructions, victim‑impact testimony) | Claims are rehashes of postconviction arguments, procedurally barred or meritless; omitted issues were not reversible/fundamental errors | Denied — claims procedurally barred or nonmeritorious; appellate performance not deficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Calhoun v. State, 138 So. 3d 350 (Fla. 2013) (direct‑appeal opinion setting out trial evidence and convictions)
- Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (penalty‑phase sentencing rule requiring jury factfinding)
- Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998) (Jones II) (standards for relief based on newly discovered evidence)
- Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991) (Jones I) (requirement to consider all admissible evidence on retrial when assessing newly discovered evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard: deficiency and prejudice)
- Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (actual conflict of interest standard that, if proved, presumes prejudice)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (State’s duty to disclose exculpatory/impeaching evidence)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (prosecutor’s duty regarding known false testimony and materiality inquiry)
- Jimenez v. State, 265 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 2018) (procedural bar on Giglio claims where defendant had the information at trial)
- Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 2009) (discussion of Jones standards and weighing newly discovered evidence)