Johnny L. Marshall v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12812
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Pizza Hut employee Geraldine Jenkins was robbed at gunpoint late at night; she described the robber and later identified Johnny Marshall after police brought Marshall (found ~1 mile away during a Terry stop) to the Pizza Hut in a show-up; Jenkins also identified Marshall from a later photo array and at trial.
- Marshall (light-skinned, taller, heavier than Jenkins’s description) was tried, convicted of armed robbery, and sentenced to life; direct appeal affirmed and he pursued a Rule 3.850 ineffective-assistance claim in Florida state court.
- Marshall alleged trial counsel McKinley was ineffective under Strickland for not moving to suppress the show-up identification as fruit of an illegal detention/transportation that exceeded Terry.
- State courts denied relief; Marshall filed a § 2254 habeas petition in federal court arguing the Florida courts unreasonably applied Strickland; the District Court denied relief and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
- The majority held (under AEDPA deference) that (1) Supreme Court precedent at the time did not clearly establish that transporting a suspect a short distance to a crime scene for identification converts a Terry stop into an arrest, and (2) counsel could reasonably have concluded a suppression motion would likely fail or that the identification had an independent source.
- Judge Rosenbaum concurred: he believed counsel was deficient under Strickland (and Florida law §901.151 likely prohibited the transport), but agreed federal habeas relief was unavailable because of AEDPA deference and exhaustion/procedural constraints.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Marshall) | Defendant's Argument (State/McKinley) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the show-up identification as fruit of an illegal seizure/transportation beyond Terry | McKinley should have moved to suppress because the Terry stop was unlawfully prolonged when officers handcuffed and transported Marshall to the Pizza Hut for identification, making the identification inadmissible | Counsel reasonably concluded the transport was within Terry or that suppression would fail; identification plausibly had independent source (Jenkins’s on-scene observation); strategic decision not to file was reasonable | Denied: under AEDPA, Florida courts’ application of Strickland was not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law; no deficient performance shown, so habeas relief denied |
| Whether the identification would have been suppressed as fruit of the alleged Fourth Amendment violation (prejudice under Strickland) | Suppression likely; without the show-up (and tainted photo array) only weak/corroboratively unreliable in-court ID remained, so prejudice is probable | Even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation, cases allow admissibility where identification stems from independent source or where the taint was purged; suppression not certain | Not reached on merits because majority found no deficient performance; AEDPA deference also supports state court conclusion that suppression was not a foregone result |
| Whether Supreme Court Fourth Amendment precedent clearly established that a short transport to a crime scene for ID converts a Terry stop into an arrest (AEDPA question) | Marshall argued the transport exceeded Terry and, in light of Hayes, Dunaway, Royer, the transport could be an arrest | State argued Supreme Court holdings did not clearly establish that such a short, crime-scene identification transport was per se an arrest; law was murky | Held: Supreme Court precedent was not clearly on point; state court’s application was not objectively unreasonable under §2254(d)(1) |
| Whether federal habeas relief is available despite state-law arguments (e.g., Fla. Stat. §901.151) | (Raised in concurrence) Florida’s stop-and-frisk statute would have barred transport and identification; counsel should have known and litigated it | State: Marshall did not properly exhaust or press state-law suppression theory in state appellate briefing; federal relief must respect exhaustion and AEDPA deference | Held: Majority found §901.151 claim unexhausted/procedurally defaulted in federal habeas; concurrence disagreed on exhaustion but agreed AEDPA still precluded relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (transport to police station without probable cause can violate Fourth Amendment)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (Plurality) (Terry stop limits discussed; movement may be justified for safety but transporting detainee to another location raises Fourth Amendment concerns)
- Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (transport to station house for investigative purposes without probable cause violates Fourth Amendment)
- Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (ineffective-assistance claim grounded in failure to litigate Fourth Amendment claim requires showing claim was meritorious and prejudice)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (exclusionary rule and "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis; independent source and attenuation doctrines)
- United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) (in-court identification may be admissible despite illegal arrest where identification did not stem from police misconduct)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (AEDPA deference; review limited to state-court record)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (state-court decisions on habeas claims get highly deferential review under AEDPA)