Johnnie Wills v. Karen Pszczolkowski
20-0472
| W. Va. | Jul 19, 2021Background:
- In March 2016 Wills and another person stole property from a residence; a jury convicted Wills of grand larceny and conspiracy to commit grand larceny but acquitted him of burglary and related charges.
- The State filed a recidivist information; Wills admitted (Oct. 21, 2016) he was the same person with prior qualifying felony convictions.
- On November 10, 2016 Wills received a life sentence with parole eligibility under the West Virginia recidivist statute for grand larceny, plus 1–5 years concurrent for conspiracy; this Court affirmed on direct appeal.
- Wills filed a habeas petition (2018); after evidentiary hearings in 2019 the Hampshire County Circuit Court denied relief on May 27, 2020, concluding the recidivist statute was constitutional.
- On appeal Wills argued he could invoke the Losh exception for collateral review because of intervening Supreme Court precedent (Sessions/Dimaya) rendering the recidivist statute unconstitutionally vague, and separately argued his life sentence is disproportionate under the West Virginia and Eighth Amendment proportionality standards.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the Dimaya/vagueness argument and finding the State’s recidivist scheme and the Hoyle proportionality test controlling and constitutional.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wills) | Defendant's Argument (Pszczolkowski) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wills may relitigate his recidivist sentence in habeas based on an intervening change in law (Losh exception) | Losh permits successive collateral attack where a favorable change in law applies retroactively, so Wills may raise Dimaya/proportionality claims post-appeal | The direct-appeal resolution is generally res judicata; any Losh exception must be narrowly applied; court may nevertheless review the merits | Court considered the claim under Losh and addressed the substantive arguments on their merits |
| Whether the recidivist statute is unconstitutionally vague under Sessions/Dimaya (residual-clause vagueness) | Dimaya renders statutes using an indefinite "residual clause" void for vagueness; Wills contends the recidivist statute is subject to the same rule and is therefore void | The West Virginia recidivist statute is plain and unambiguous and materially different from the statutes invalidated in Johnson/Dimaya; those precedents do not control | Rejected — court found the recidivist statute clear and prior WV precedent applicable, so Dimaya/Johnson do not invalidate it |
| Whether Wills’ life recidivist sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate under Article III, §5 and the Eighth Amendment | Wills contends his triggering offense(s) were nonviolent and thus a life recidivist sentence is disproportionate under Hoyle-derived proportionality analysis | The State argues Hoyle and related WV precedent supply the correct proportionality test and that Wills’ prior convictions satisfy the statutory and Hoyle thresholds | Rejected — court applied Hoyle/Beck framework and found no constitutional disproportionality |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (three-prong standard of review in habeas appeals)
- Anstey v. Ballard, 237 W. Va. 411, 787 S.E.2d 864 (cited for appellate review principles)
- Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762, 277 S.E.2d 606 (permits successive collateral relief when a change in law favorable to petitioner is retroactively applicable)
- State v. Hoyle, 242 W. Va. 599, 836 S.E.2d 817 (establishes proportionality analysis for life recidivist sentences)
- State v. Beck, 167 W. Va. 830, 286 S.E.2d 234 (requires two of three felonies supporting recidivist life sentence involve violence, threat, or substantial victim harm)
- State ex rel. Appleby v. Recht, 213 W. Va. 503, 583 S.E.2d 800 (construed WV recidivist statute as plain and unambiguous)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (Supreme Court vagueness precedent relied on by Wills)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (residual-clause invalidation referenced in petitioner’s argument)
