Johney Finn v. Warren County, Kentucky
768 F.3d 441
6th Cir.2014Background
- Pretrial detainee Shannon Finn exhibited alcohol withdrawal after booking into Warren County Regional Jail in March 2009; SHP medical staff placed him on an alcohol detox protocol and administered oral meds.
- Night-shift jailers and an SHP nurse observed worsening withdrawal symptoms (shaking, sweating, confusion, delusions); Finn was moved to a medical observation cell but declined placement earlier and expressed fear of being alone.
- Multiple cellmates repeatedly alerted jail staff that Finn was in danger; jail logs show repeated entries of "appears to be okay" despite eyewitness accounts of severe symptoms.
- Finn was found unresponsive and later died; autopsy attributed death to delirium tremens from ethanol withdrawal (with underlying hypertensive heart disease noted).
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Kentucky tort law against the county, jail officials, SHP, and medical staff. After summary-judgment dismissals and a jury trial, verdicts largely favored defendants.
- On appeal the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment for Jailer Jackie Strode (qualified official immunity) and remanded for trial on plaintiffs’ negligence claims against him; all other rulings were affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment (qualified official immunity) for Jailer Strode on state-law negligence/gross negligence claims was proper | Strode negligently failed to train/enforce the EMS policy; supervision/enforcement are ministerial duties (no immunity) | Supervision, training, and enforcement are discretionary responsibilities entitled to qualified official immunity | Reversed: training/enforcement of an adopted policy are ministerial under Kentucky law; Strode not entitled to immunity and must face trial on negligence claims |
| JMOL for deputy jailers on negligence/gross negligence | Evidence established deputy jailers breached EMS policy and were negligent per se under KRS 441.045 and KRS 446.070 | Evidence was disputed; reasonable jurors could find no negligence; no negligence per se because not all elements shown and internal policy is not a regulatory standard | Affirmed: district court properly denied JMOL; genuine fact disputes supported jury verdict for deputy jailers |
| County § 1983 failure-to-train claim (deliberate indifference) | County training was constitutionally inadequate without needing to prove individual mens rea first | County argued plaintiffs waived or could not prove derivative deliberate indifference | Issue waived at trial by plaintiffs’ counsel agreeing to a derivative instruction; not considered on appeal |
| Exclusion of defense expert Dr. Alan Weder | Weder’s report failed to state opinions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty; testimony should be excluded | Court limited Weder to disclosed opinions and accepted his in-court statement of opinions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty | Affirmed: court allowed testimony (limited); plaintiffs’ Daubert/reliability challenge not preserved on appeal; any erroneous damages instruction was harmless because jury found no liability |
Key Cases Cited
- Hedgepath v. Pelphrey, [citation="520 F. App'x 385"] (6th Cir. 2013) (supervisory jailers denied qualified immunity where failure to train/enforce written policy implicated ministerial duties)
- Walker v. Davis, 643 F. Supp. 2d 921 (W.D. Ky. 2009) (district court opinion relied on below regarding scope of supervisory duties and immunity)
- Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001) (distinguishes discretionary policymaking from ministerial duty to follow and enforce established rules)
- Tompkins v. Crown Corr., Inc., 726 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 2013) (standard for de novo review of summary-judgment rulings cited by parties)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (subjective component of deliberate indifference requires recklessness)
- Flechsig v. United States, 991 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1993) (internal prison procedures do not automatically create negligence per se)
