John Zwiacher v. Capstone Family Medical Clinic, LLC, 476 P.3d 1139

Plaintiff John Zwiacher (physician) and defendant Capstone Family Medical Clinic had an arrangement to lease two medical suites; Zwiacher took possession of build-outs and equipment but failed to pay rent or construction costs.
Capstone sued (forcible entry and detainer); after Zwiacher’s counsel withdrew in 2012, he stopped participating and the district court entered default judgment in 2013 for ~ $92,000.
In 2014 Capstone levied Zwiacher’s bank account; Zwiacher then moved for Rule 60(b) relief, submitting an affidavit stating he had assumed the case had been dismissed after a 2011 possession hearing and was shocked to learn of the judgment.
The superior court reversed the district court’s denial of Rule 60(b) relief for lack of notice; on remand Zwiacher was allowed to amend his answer in 2016 to add a conversion counterclaim for medical equipment.
The conversion claim was likely time-barred unless it related back to the 2011 answer; the district court held Zwiacher judicially estopped from asserting the counterclaim as inconsistent with his 2014 affidavit, and the superior court affirmed.
The Alaska Supreme Court granted review and reversed: it held the two positions were not "clearly inconsistent" as a matter of law, so judicial estoppel did not apply; the case was remanded for further proceedings on the counterclaim.

Issue	Zwiacher's Argument	Capstone's Argument	Held
Whether judicial estoppel bars Zwiacher’s conversion counterclaim (filed in 2016) because he previously stated in a 2014 affidavit that he believed the case had been dismissed in 2011	His affidavit and later counterclaim are not clearly inconsistent: a litigant reasonably may abandon a claim if he believes the case was dismissed and later revive it when he learns a judgment was entered	Zwiacher’s earlier position (that the case was dismissed) contradicts a compulsory conversion counterclaim existing in 2011; allowing the counterclaim would permit perjury or a tactical advantage and harm judicial integrity	Reversed: positions not "clearly inconsistent" as a matter of law, so judicial estoppel inapplicable; remanded for further proceedings

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (articulates flexible three-factor approach to judicial estoppel and emphasizes requirement that later position be "clearly inconsistent")
Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966 (Alaska 2011) (discusses judicial estoppel and related doctrines in Alaska decisions)
Ray v. Draeger, 353 P.3d 806 (Alaska 2015) (discusses standard for appellate review of superior court orders reviewing district court rulings)
Powers v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 6 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2000) (addresses de novo review of estoppel principles)
Jamison v. Consol. Utils., Inc., 576 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1978) (explains factual determinations in quasi-estoppel reviewed for clear error)
Roman v. Karren, 461 P.3d 1252 (Alaska 2020) (states abuse-of-discretion standard for trial court's decision to apply estoppel)
Simpson v. Murkowski, 129 P.3d 435 (Alaska 2006) (example where positions were not contradictory and estoppel was unnecessary)
Brooks v. Hollaar, 297 P.3d 125 (Alaska 2013) (refuses judicial estoppel where no prior contradictory declaration was made)