363 P.3d 854
Idaho2015Background
- Plaintiff John Wickel underwent hemorrhoid surgery by Dr. David Chamberlain in January 2010 using an Ethicon PPH device; an anal fissure was discovered intraoperatively and treated with fissurectomy and lateral internal sphincterotomy.
- Postoperatively Wickel developed pain, a perianal abscess and chronic fistula; subsequent surgeons in Utah concluded the PPH staple line was placed too low, injuring the sphincter.
- Wickel sued for medical malpractice (including lack of informed consent). Chamberlain moved for summary judgment arguing absence of required expert proof under Idaho Code § 6-1013.
- Wickel submitted affidavits from Dr. Joseph Scoma (California-licensed colorectal surgeon) and a paralegal who reported no PPH-using general surgeons in Idaho Falls; Scoma relied on conversations with a Twin Falls surgeon who used the PPH device.
- The district court excluded Scoma’s initial affidavit for failure to show Twin Falls and Idaho Falls are similar communities, granted summary judgment, entered a flawed July 2013 judgment, and denied a first reconsideration motion.
- After this Court remanded to obtain a Rule 54(a)-compliant final judgment, Wickel filed a second motion for reconsideration before the corrected final judgment; the district court held it lacked jurisdiction because more than 14 days had passed since the defective July judgment. Wickel appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether motion for reconsideration was timely / court had jurisdiction to hear second motion | Wickel: July 30 document was not a final judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(a); motion filed before entry of a proper final judgment and thus timely under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) | Chamberlain: 14-day reconsideration clock should run from July 30 judgment; allowing otherwise unfairly benefits party who appealed | Court: Vacated denial — July 30 order was not a final judgment; second motion was timely because no final judgment existed when filed; remanded for merits review |
| Whether expert Scoma could rely on practice in a "similar community" (Twin Falls) when local standard indeterminable | Wickel: Wilson affidavit showed no local PPH practitioners; Scoma may rely on similar community standard (Twin Falls) and his conversations/supporting affidavits | Chamberlain: Scoma failed to show he familiarized himself with applicable standard and plaintiff failed to show similarity between communities; initial affidavits inadmissible | Court: Did not decide merits; remanded for district court to determine admissibility of Scoma’s third affidavit (error to refuse to consider timely reconsideration) |
| Whether district court erred in striking or excluding Scoma’s affidavits | Wickel: Supplemental affidavits supplied community-similarity facts and training links supporting admissibility | Chamberlain: Later affidavits were sham / insufficient to establish admissibility | Court: Declined to resolve on appeal; directed district court to consider admissibility on remand |
| Broader standard: national vs local standard for device use | Wickel: Where local practitioners are unavailable, standard may be established by similar community or national guidance; here evidence suggests common training and practice | Chamberlain: Emphasized need to apply local standard or show community similarity before admitting expert testimony | Court: Expressed caution against over-technical application of statutes and suggested it would be odd to bar an expert who and whose instructor used same device/procedure — but left the question for district court on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801 (2012) (standard of review for summary judgment and admissibility of expert testimony)
- Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169 (2014) (admissibility of expert testimony is threshold question distinct from summary judgment merits)
- Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266 (2012) (standard for reviewing motions for reconsideration after summary judgment)
- Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161 (2007) (order granting summary judgment is interlocutory until entry of final judgment and subject to reconsideration under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B))
- Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 Idaho 202 (1994) (motion to reconsider timely if no final judgment existed when filed)
- Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10 (2006) (remand required where trial court’s discretion was affected by an error of law)
- Holland v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 153 Idaho 94 (2012) (document failing to comply with I.R.C.P. 54(a) is not a final judgment)
- Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1 (2009) (admissibility of evidence entrusted to trial court discretion)
