John W. Wood, Jr. v. John Kelly
17-11055
| 11th Cir. | Dec 14, 2017Background
- John Wood Jr., a disabled Army veteran proceeding pro se, applied repeatedly to work at Florida Atlantic University (FAU), was hired, then terminated after five months in 2006 and pursued multiple legal challenges.
- In August 2016 Wood sued three FAU officials in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations based on USERRA, and deprivation of due process and equal protection; he also asserted claims relying on federal criminal statutes.
- The district court dismissed all counts under Rule 12(b)(6) as time-barred; Wood appealed.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo the dismissal and the statute-of-limitations rulings, construing pro se allegations liberally but requiring plausible factual allegations under Iqbal/Twombly.
- The panel affirmed dismissal with prejudice: constitutional § 1983 claims (Count II) and claims invoking criminal statutes (Counts III & IV) were time-barred or not privately enforceable; the USERRA-based § 1983 claim (Count I) was governed by § 1658’s four-year catch-all and was also time barred.
- The court declined to import USERRA’s 38 U.S.C. § 4327(b) no-limit filing provision into § 1983 claims (following Abrams reasoning) and held amendment would be futile.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wood's § 1983 due-process/equal protection claims (Count II) are time-barred | Wood argued claims arose from FAU’s 2005–2006 conduct but sought relief despite delay | Defendants argued Florida's 4‑year statute for personal injury actions bars suit | Held: Time-barred under Florida’s 4‑year limitations for § 1983 constitutional claims; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether claims based on federal criminal statutes (Counts III & IV) are actionable civilly | Wood invoked 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 1503, 1505 to support § 1983 relief | Defendants argued those are criminal statutes that create no private civil remedy and are time‑barred | Held: Dismissed—no private cause of action under § 1983 and, alternatively, time‑barred |
| Whether a § 1983 claim predicated on USERRA (Count I) is governed by USERRA’s § 4327(b) no‑limit filing provision or by § 1658 | Wood argued § 4327(b) (added 2008) eliminates any limitations for USERRA claims and thus applies to his § 1983 enforcement of USERRA rights | Defendants argued § 1658’s 4‑year federal catch‑all governs § 1983 actions; USERRA’s internal limitation does not displace § 1658 for § 1983 suits | Held: § 4327(b) cannot be borrowed into § 1983; § 1658’s 4‑year period applies, so Count I is time‑barred |
| Whether dismissal should be without prejudice to amend | Wood sought leave to amend; argued futility not shown | Defendants opposed amendment as futile given statute‑of‑limitations and immunity issues | Held: Amendment would be futile; dismissal with prejudice proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010) (standards for Rule 12(b)(6) review and pleading plausibility)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for complaints)
- Foudy v. Indian River Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 845 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 2017) (§ 1658 governs § 1983 claims based on post‑1990 federal statutes)
- City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005) (limits on borrowing a federal statute’s limitations provision into § 1983 and § 1658’s scope)
- Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (definition of "arising under" for statutes creating causes of action)
- Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (Florida’s personal injury limitations apply to § 1983 actions absent other governing federal period)
- Collier v. Dickinson, 477 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007) (requirements for a federal statute to be enforceable via § 1983)
- La Grasta v. First Union Secs., Inc., 358 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 2004) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute‑of‑limitations grounds appropriate when facially time‑barred)