John W. Boyd, Jr. v. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton, 164 A.3d 72

Background

Boyd, a lobbyist, alleges he helped secure passage of the Claims Resolution Act (CRA) in Dec. 2010 at the request of Kilpatrick Townsend personnel and Gingold, expecting payment for lobbying services.
Boyd claims Gingold (solo practitioner) and Kilpatrick Townsend (law firm) benefitted when the CRA passed and when defendants later received attorney fees; he alleges breach of an implied-in-fact contract/quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.
Boyd sued in federal court in 2012; that suit was dismissed for insufficient factual detail. He filed in D.C. Superior Court in May 2014.
Trial court dismissed Boyd’s claims under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6), concluding unjust enrichment and implied-in-fact claims were time-barred under the “last rendition of services” rule and that Boyd failed to allege Gingold had authority to bind Kilpatrick Townsend.
On appeal the D.C. Court of Appeals: affirmed dismissal of the implied-in-fact claim against Gingold as time‑barred; affirmed dismissal of the implied‑in‑fact claim against Kilpatrick Townsend for failure to plead agency; vacated dismissal of unjust enrichment claims and remanded for factual findings on accrual.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When do unjust enrichment claims accrue (statute of limitations)?	Accrual waited until defendants received attorneys’ fees / benefit (July 27, 2011) or when payment was effectively withheld.	Accrual occurred at last rendition of services (when CRA passed, Dec. 8, 2010); plaintiff didn’t demand payment within a reasonable time.	Vacated dismissal; unjust enrichment accrual is fact‑specific. Remand for jury findings on when payment was reasonably demanded and when refusal made enrichment unjust.
When does breach of implied‑in‑fact contract (quantum meruit) accrue against Gingold?	Accrual should await defendants’ receipt of benefit or later demand.	Accrual occurred when services were completed (Dec. 8, 2010) and payment was due then.	Affirmed dismissal as time‑barred: claim accrued Dec. 8, 2010; suit filed too late.
Whether Gingold’s statements bind Kilpatrick Townsend (agency) such that Kilpatrick Townsend can be liable on implied contract	Gingold acted as Kilpatrick Townsend’s agent/co‑counsel and thus could bind the firm to pay Boyd.	Gingold and Kilpatrick Townsend were co‑counsel for clients, not agents of one another; no allegations of mutual control, authority to bind, or joint venture.	Affirmed dismissal: complaint fails to plausibly allege Gingold had authority to bind Kilpatrick Townsend; no implied‑in‑fact contract stated against the firm.
Adequacy of pleading for implied‑in‑fact contract / quantum meruit	Complaint alleges requests to Boyd, assurances of payment, and continued work — sufficient to state claims.	Allegations were conclusory and lacked factual detail; statute defense barred claims.	Partially: pleading was adequate for unjust enrichment (remanded); but implied‑in‑fact contract claim against Gingold barred by statute; against Kilpatrick Townsend insufficiently pleaded agency.

Key Cases Cited

Poola v. Howard Univ., 147 A.3d 267 (D.C. 2016) (12(b)(6) dismissal standard; accept complaint facts as true)
News World Commc’ns, Inc. v. Thompsen, 878 A.2d 1218 (D.C. 2005) (unjust enrichment accrues when last service rendered and compensation wrongfully withheld)
Jordan Keys & Jessamy, LLP v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 870 A.3d 58 (D.C. 2005) (elements and scope of unjust enrichment/quantum meruit)
Peart v. District of Columbia Hous. Auth., 972 A.2d 810 (D.C. 2009) (definition of unjust enrichment elements)
Cunningham & Assocs. v. Dugan, 909 A.2d 1001 (D.C. 1996) (fees due at completion absent agreement to contrary)
Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609 (3d Cir. 2004) (application of last‑rendition‑of‑services accrual rule)