937 F.3d 1162
8th Cir.2019Background
- Missouri enacted the Sexually Violent Predator Act (1998), permitting civil commitment when a person has a "mental abnormality" making them more likely than not to commit predatory sexual violence; commitment requires clear-and-convincing proof.
- Missouri law requires annual reports by the Department of Mental Health director and provides pathways for conditional release: the director may authorize a petition or a resident may petition independently; a court decides release by preponderance, and the State must prove continued danger by clear and convincing evidence.
- A class of committed residents sued state officials (2009), alleging the treatment/release program is a "sham" and, as applied, violates substantive due process by preventing realistic opportunities for release.
- The district court initially found the program unconstitutional as applied, identifying three defects: (1) annual reviewers applying incorrect legal standards; (2) failure to release low‑risk residents into less restrictive housing (use of "release without discharge"); and (3) the director failing to authorize petitions for release.
- After this court decided Karsjens v. Piper, the district court sua sponte reconsidered, concluded Karsjens was materially indistinguishable, and entered judgment for the state officials; the residents appealed.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: plaintiffs’ as‑applied substantive due process claims fail because they do not implicate a fundamental right under Glucksberg and the alleged conduct is not conscience‑shocking (and the state‑law claims were abandoned).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state officials’ conduct violated substantive due process (fundamental‑rights prong) | Residents argued the officials’ failures created a state‑created liberty interest in certain state actions (periodic correct reviews, authorization of petitions, release into less‑restrictive housing) that substantive due process protects | State argued release procedures and independent judicial review exist under Missouri law; the alleged implementation failures do not create a fundamental right protected by substantive due process | Held: No fundamental right — plaintiffs’ demands are state‑law entitlements for procedural protection, not substantive rights implicit in ordered liberty; claim fails under Glucksberg test |
| Whether officials’ conduct was conscience‑shocking (as‑applied substantive due process) | Residents argued officials were deliberately indifferent/malicious in maintaining procedures that prolonged confinement and blocked release opportunities | State argued the program’s shortcomings are not more egregious than those in Karsjens, and judicial review remains available; some failings stem from funding or training, not malice | Held: Conduct is not conscience‑shocking; Karsjens shows similar deficiencies did not meet the standard, so as‑applied claim fails |
| Proper standard for conscience‑shocking (intent‑to‑harm vs deliberate indifference) | Residents urged a deliberate‑indifference standard because officials had time to deliberate | State suggested an intent‑to‑harm standard may apply where officials balance competing legitimate interests | Held: Court did not definitively choose a single standard but ruled plaintiffs’ allegations fail under either standard |
| Whether state‑law (Missouri Constitution) claims were preserved / dismissal with prejudice proper | Residents claimed state‑constitutional claims but contended they remained viable | State argued plaintiffs abandoned state‑law claims by not developing them in briefing and failing to raise them after the liability order | Held: District court did not abuse discretion in dismissing state‑law claims with prejudice as abandoned |
Key Cases Cited
- Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017) (rejected as‑applied substantive due process challenge to Minnesota’s civil‑commitment program)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding civil‑commitment scheme for sexually violent predators)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (defining "conscience‑shocking" standard for executive action)
- Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (framework for identifying fundamental rights protected by substantive due process)
- Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (distinguishing substantive due process from procedural due process claims)
- O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (liberty interest in release when justification for confinement no longer exists)
- Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (state statutes may create liberty interests entitled to procedural due process)