John Valerio v. Scott Frauenheim, 2:17-cv-07706-MAA

Background

Petitioner John Valerio was convicted in 2014 in Los Angeles County of arson, insurance fraud, and conspiracy; sentenced to 11 years. The fire destroyed his business premises; prosecution relied on arson investigator findings, gasoline residues, a lighter, road flares, alarm-code activity, and an insurance policy obtained six weeks earlier.
Pretrial history included a long, multi-year docket with multiple continuances; Petitioner retained private counsel Leonard Levine in May 2013, who later sought continuances for health and calendar reasons and ultimately was relieved by the trial court in May 2014 for lack of readiness.
The trial court ordered Petitioner to obtain new retained counsel within a short period (initially 10–14 days) and required any replacement counsel to be prepared to try the case within 60 days; Petitioner waived a 3-day speedy-trial demand and accepted the continuance schedule; Robert Haberer substituted and tried the case starting September 2014.
At trial defense counsel Haberer called only one witness (an arson investigator) and declined to cross-examine certain prosecution witnesses; several potential defense witnesses later submitted declarations asserting they would have testified favorably for Petitioner.
Postconviction, Petitioner pursued habeas petitions in state court (denied by Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court) and petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court raising three grounds: (1) deprivation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel (Haberer); (3) freestanding actual innocence based on newly discovered witness confession (Mascaro).
The federal magistrate judge denied relief on all grounds, applying AEDPA deference to the state-court adjudication and finding the state courts’ rulings were not unreasonable.

Issues

Issue	Valerio's Argument	Frauenheim's Argument	Held
Whether removing retained counsel (Levine) violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice	Levine’s removal deprived Valerio of his chosen counsel and was unjustified given prior continuances granted to other parties	Court reasonably balanced defendant’s right against court calendar, Levine’s repeated, indeterminate continuances, and case age	Denied — removal was within trial court’s wide latitude and not an unreasonable application of federal law
Whether the 10–14 day deadline to obtain new counsel and 60-day preparedness requirement violated counsel-of-choice rights	Timeline was too strict, caused prospective counsel to decline, effectively denying choice	Scheduling decisions within court’s discretion; Valerio even sought speedy resolution; court later permitted substitution and Haberer had more than 60 days	Denied — scheduling was reasonable under Gonzalez‑Lopez and Slappy and not constitutionally infirm
Whether Haberer provided ineffective assistance (failure to prepare, to cross-examine key witnesses, and not to call defense witnesses)	Haberer failed to investigate, did not interview/call key witnesses, declined cross-exams, and these failures prejudiced outcome	Tactical decisions (investigator use, cross-exam choices, calling witnesses) were reasonable; Petitioner cannot show Strickland prejudice	Denied — counsel’s performance fell within reasonable professional judgment and no reasonable probability of a different result
Whether newly discovered deposition of Mascaro (confessing that "Sergio" set the fire) establishes freestanding actual innocence	Mascaro’s sworn account exculpates Valerio and points to Ramirez (Sergio) as arsonist, so verdict likely different	Mascaro is a felon with credibility problems; evidence is neither conclusive nor reliably persuasive	Denied — Supreme Court hasn’t recognized cognizable freestanding innocence claims; even assuming cognizable, Mascaro’s testimony is not sufficiently reliable to satisfy the extraordinary standard

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Gonzalez‑Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (right to counsel of choice can be denied when trial court reasonably balances that right against fairness and docket management)
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (right to counsel of choice is not absolute; courts may refuse counsel for compelling purposes)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (state court decisions must be objectively unreasonable to grant habeas relief under AEDPA)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (clarifies AEDPA standard distinguishing decisions that are contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court holdings)