John Urquhart v. $6,510.00 And Richard Mendall
75026-7
| Wash. Ct. App. | Dec 27, 2016Background
- King County deputies seized weapons, drugs, and $6,510 from Richard Mendall during a traffic stop; KCSO mailed notice of seizure and intended forfeiture on June 9, 2014.
- Mendall mailed a notice of claim and request for a forfeiture hearing on July 3, 2014.
- A hearing was initially set for September 30, 2014; KCSO requested continuances due to counsel's family medical emergency and the examiner's preplanned vacation.
- The hearing was continued and ultimately held on December 9, 2014; the hearing examiner ruled for KCSO and ordered forfeiture; superior court affirmed.
- Mendall argued the hearing was untimely (beyond 90 days from seizure) and that the examiner abused discretion in granting continuances; KCSO and the examiner argued the 90‑day clock runs from the claimant’s notice of claim and that the continuances were for good cause.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed: the hearing was timely under controlling precedent and the examiner did not abuse discretion in granting continuances for a family medical emergency and a prescheduled vacation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mendall) | Defendant's Argument (KCSO) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the 90‑day hearing requirement run from? | 90 days runs from the date of seizure per RCW 69.50.505(3) (seizure "commences" proceedings). | 90 days runs from claimant's notice of claim (triggering APA timing). | Court: runs from claimant's notice of claim; existing precedent upheld. |
| Whether the examiner abused discretion in granting continuances that pushed the hearing beyond 90 days | Continuances were improper and violated due process because hearing occurred more than 90 days after seizure. | Continuances were for good cause (counsel's family medical emergency and examiner's prescheduled vacation); no prejudice shown. | Court: no abuse of discretion; continuances for medical emergency and vacation constituted good cause; delay did not violate controlling precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tellevik v. 31641 West Rutherford Street, 120 Wn.2d 68 (Wash. 1992) (read a 90‑day hearing requirement into the statute to preserve constitutionality)
- Tellevik v. 31641 West Rutherford Street, 125 Wn.2d 364 (Wash. 1994) (reaffirming the 90‑day hearing requirement and its centrality)
- In re the Forfeiture of One 1988 Black Chevrolet Corvette, 91 Wn. App. 320 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (held the 90‑day hearing window is triggered by claimant's notice of claim under the APA)
- Escamilla v. Tri‑City Metro Drug Task Force, 100 Wn. App. 742 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (applies Black Chevrolet Corvette timing approach)
- City of Des Moines v. Personal Prop. Identified as $81,231 in U.S. Currency, 87 Wn. App. 689 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (continuances that move a timely scheduled hearing beyond 90 days do not necessarily violate Tellevik)