John Thomas Hereford, 342 P.3d 1201

Hereford was tried for second-degree murder (shooting Travis Armajo), kidnapping, and two counts of first-degree sexual assault of Armajo’s girlfriend B.B.; jury convicted on murder, kidnapping, and one sexual-assault count.
Facts: Hereford brandished a pistol earlier, said he would “waste a few shells,” shot Armajo multiple times (two bullets traced to his pistol), and later assaulted and threatened B.B. with the same pistol, telling her he had killed Armajo.
Physical and forensic evidence linked Hereford to the killing and assaults (blood on clothing, bloody shoe and door at B.B.’s home, ballistics, DNA).
Trial court instructed the jury it "may, but is not required to, presume malice from the use of a deadly weapon" (Instruction No. 15); Hereford objected.
Hereford moved pretrial to sever the murder charge from the kidnapping/sexual-assault charges; motion denied.
On appeal, Hereford challenged (1) the permissive-presumption instruction and (2) the denial of severance; the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Hereford)	Held
Whether the jury instruction allowing a presumption of malice from use of a deadly weapon was unconstitutional	Instruction was a permissible, non-mandatory inference justified by the evidence and W.R.E. 303	Instruction functioned as a presumption shifting burden to defendant (impermissible)	Affirmed: instruction was a permissible inference when read with other instructions; preferable to use “infer” rather than “presume.”
Whether the court abused discretion by denying severance of murder from kidnapping/sexual-assault counts	Joinder proper: offenses were connected in time, place, scheme; overlapping evidence would be admissible in separate trials	Different victims, times, locations; joinder prejudiced defendant and required separate trials under Rule 14	Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; offenses were part of a common scheme/transaction and jury could separately evaluate counts (jury acquitted on one count).

Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (constitutional rule forbidding jury instructions that create mandatory presumptions)
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (permissive inferences are constitutional if they are rational in light of proven facts)
County Court of Ulster Cnty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (distinguishing permissive from mandatory presumptions)
Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750 (Wyo. 1987) (Wyoming accepts permissive inference of malice from deadly-weapon use if facts justify it)
Eckert v. State, 680 P.2d 478 (Wyo. 1984) (upholding permissive presumption of malice from deadly weapon)
Hernandez v. State, 162 P.3d 472 (Wyo. 2007) (warning that jury instructions creating mandatory presumptions violate due process)