208 So. 3d 694
Fla.2016Background
- John Sebo bought a custom (manuscript) Naples home in 2005 insured by an all‑risk policy issued by American Home Assurance Co. (AHAC).
- Shortly after purchase, recurrent water intrusion and design/construction defects produced major damage; Hurricane Wilma later worsened harms and the house was ultimately demolished.
- Sebo reported the loss late in December 2005; AHAC paid $50,000 for mold but denied coverage for the bulk of property damage citing policy exclusions for defective design/construction.
- Sebo sued multiple parties; after settling most claims, he amended to add AHAC and pursued a declaratory judgment that the policy covered his loss; a jury found for Sebo and judgment entered against AHAC.
- The Second District reversed, applying the efficient proximate cause (EPC) theory and directing a new trial; Sebo petitioned to resolve conflict with the Third District’s concurrent cause doctrine (CCD) in Wallach.
- The Florida Supreme Court quashed the Second District, approved Wallach’s concurrent cause approach for independent, combined perils, and remanded (also addressing admissibility of settlements for offset post‑judgment).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an all‑risk policy covers loss caused by multiple independent perils when at least one peril is excluded | Sebo: CCD applies — when independent insured and excluded perils combine to cause loss, coverage may exist because no single efficient cause can be identified | AHAC: EPC should apply — identify the efficient/proximate cause; if an excluded peril is the efficient cause, no coverage; CCD would nullify exclusions | Court: Where independent perils combine and no single efficient cause can be identified, CCD applies; Wallach approved and Second District reversed/quashed |
| Whether policy language explicitly negates application of CCD | Sebo: Policy does not explicitly preclude CCD; exclusions govern coverage and ambiguity construes against insurer | AHAC: (argued below but did not preserve) EPC should supplant CCD or policy language forecloses CCD | Court: Policy here did not explicitly exclude CCD; thus CCD applies absent clear contrary language |
| Admissibility of prior settlements at trial on liability or for offset | AHAC: Settlement amounts should be considered (for offset) | Sebo: Trial court excluded settlements under Saleeby as inadmissible on liability | Court: Saleeby bars disclosure of settlements to jury on liability; but settlements may be considered for post‑judgment offset — remanded to reconsider offset question |
| Whether Second District properly reached abrogation of CCD | AHAC: (not preserved) argued EPC should replace CCD | Trial/Second Dist.: addressed EPC v. CCD | Court: EPC abrogation was not raised/preserved; Second District improperly decided an unpreserved issue; Supreme Court nonetheless resolved conflict in favor of CCD in these circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Wallach v. Rosenberg, 527 So.2d 1386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (adopts concurrent cause doctrine where independent perils combine to produce loss)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal.3d 94 (Cal. 1973) (formulation and adoption of concurrent‑cause reasoning in insurance context)
- Sabella v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 59 Cal.2d 21 (Cal. 1963) (exposition of efficient proximate cause doctrine)
- Fire Ass’n of Phila. v. Evansville Brewing Ass’n, 73 Fla. 904 (Fla. 1917) (Florida application of EPC in chain‑of‑events loss scenarios)
- Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 48 Cal.3d 395 (Cal. 1989) (clarifies limits of CCD and EPC interplay; relied on by Second District)
- Fayad v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 899 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 2005) (rules on construction of all‑risk policies and treatment of ambiguities)
- Auto‑Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2000) (principles on construing insurance contract language and exclusions)
- Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Construction, Inc., 3 So.3d 1078 (Fla. 2009) (settlement evidence barred from jury on liability; settlements may be considered for post‑judgment offset)
