John Priester, Jr. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 708 F.3d 667

In 2005, the Priesters obtained a $180,000 home equity loan secured by a first lien on their homestead from Long Beach Mortgage.
Closing occurred in the Priesters’ living room, allegedly violating Texas Constitution § 50(a)(6)(N) and the required closing locations in § 50(a)(6)(M).
The Priesters claim they did not receive the twelve-day rights notice before closing as required by § 50(a)(6)(M)(i) and (g).
Chase acquired the loan; the Priesters sued in state court in 2010 for voiding the lien and for damages, later removing to federal court.
The district court and magistrate judge dismissed or struck amendments as time-barred or non-diverse; jurisdiction depended on complete diversity.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding a four-year limitations period applies and accrues at loan closing; fraud tolling did not apply; and amendments to join non-diverse parties were properly struck.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether limitations apply to § 50(a)(6) defects	Priesters contend no limitations defense applies to constitutional infirmities.	Chase argues four-year limitations applies to § 50(a)(6) claims.	Limitations period applies.
What is the accrual rule for limitations on constitutional defects	Priesters seek discovery-rule tolling based on cure/notice events.	Chase argues injury rule; accrual at loan closing.	Injury rule applies; accrual at closing.
Does fraudulent concealment toll limitations here	Defendants concealed illegality, tolling limitations.	No concealment; no duty to disclose; no tolling.	Fraudulent concealment tolling does not apply.
Is the defamation claim time-barred or derivative	Defamation independent of lien validity and timely.	Defamation is derivative of lien viability; time-barred when underlying claim is time-barred.	No defamation liability; underlying lien validity governs; time-bar applies.
Whether district court properly struck second/third amended complaints joined with non-diverse parties	Rule 16(b) scheduling order allowed amendments; diversity preserved only if proper.	Joinder of non-diverse parties destroys jurisdiction; amendments were properly struck.	District court did not abuse discretion; denied amendments to preserve jurisdiction.

Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 262 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008) (four-year limitations applies to constitutional lien defects)
Ho v. University of Texas at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998) (constitutional claims subjected to statutory limitations)
Calverley v. Gunstream, 497 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1973) (limitations apply to enforcement of constitutional rights)
Doody v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 49 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2001) (lien cureability; voided liens may be cured)
Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 348 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. 2011) (statutory limitations governing discovery of injury)
S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996) (limits discovery rule for inherently undiscoverable injuries)
Peshak v. Greer, 13 S.W.3d 421 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000) (defamation issues and privilege considerations)
Randall's Food Mkt., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995) (truth as complete defense to defamation)
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (U.S. Supreme Court 1962) (federal standard for granting leave to amend)