John Porterfield v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A.
682 F. App'x 287
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Galland obtained a $240,000 loan in 2005 secured by a deed of trust on 2 Walnut Grove Road; loan later assigned to Deutsche Bank and serviced by WaMu (later JPMorgan Chase).
- Porterfields entered a contract for deed with Galland in March 2006 and received an agreed judgment transferring the property to them on April 19, 2007.
- Lender sent a notice of acceleration and foreclosure on August 14, 2007; Porterfields obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) from Sept. 28–Oct. 25, 2007 to enjoin foreclosure in an earlier suit.
- Galland died on or about June 3, 2008. Parties mediated in Sept. 2011 and signed a Mediated Settlement Agreement requiring payment by Dec. 31, 2011; the deadline was missed and a second notice of acceleration was sent July 16, 2012.
- Deutsche Bank purchased the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale on August 7, 2012; Porterfields sued alleging the foreclosure was time‑barred under Texas’s four‑year statute for foreclosure actions.
- District court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 16.062 tolled the limitations period for one year after Galland’s death; Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the nonjudicial foreclosure was time‑barred under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.035 | Foreclosure was barred because more than four years elapsed from the Aug. 14, 2007 acceleration to the Aug. 7, 2012 sale | The limitations period was tolled for one year after Galland’s death under § 16.062, so foreclosure occurred within the extended period | Court held § 16.062 tolled the limitations period one year after death, so foreclosure was timely |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. World All. Fin. Corp., 830 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2016) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- BMG Music v. Martinez, 74 F.3d 87 (5th Cir. 1996) (appellate courts may affirm on any legally sufficient ground)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (standard for genuine dispute of material fact at summary judgment)
- Boren v. U.S. Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 807 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 2015) (notice of intent to accelerate and notice of acceleration trigger accrual for foreclosure statute)
- Davidson v. FDIC, 44 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1995) (harmonizing limitations for mortgage foreclosure and underlying debt; protection for bona fide purchasers)