John P. Thurlow v. Zakia C. Nelson, 263 A.3d 494

Background

Thurlow sued Zakia and Ross Nelson for defamation based on a letter they sent to Scarborough school officials accusing him of misconduct (bullying, record destruction, retaliation, unfitness for position).
The Nelsons removed the case to Superior Court and filed a special motion to dismiss under Maine’s anti‑SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556; Thurlow opposed with a detailed affidavit denying the allegations and stating he had been exonerated after a third‑party investigation and suffered medical and economic harms.
The trial court granted the Nelsons’ special motion without a hearing, finding the letter was petitioning activity and that Thurlow failed to present prima facie evidence that the letter was devoid of factual support.
On appeal the Maine Supreme Judicial Court agreed the letter qualified as petitioning activity (step one) but held Thurlow had presented prima facie evidence that at least one petitioning activity was devoid of reasonable factual support and that he suffered actual injury (step two).
To avoid infringing the right to a jury trial, the Court abandoned Gaudette I’s third-step fact‑finding/evidentiary‑hearing requirement and restored the Nader I two‑step prima facie framework; it vacated the dismissal and remanded with instructions to deny the special motion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Nelsons’ letter constituted "petitioning activity" under § 556	Thurlow contended the letter’s defamatory content should not be protected if devoid of support	Nelsons argued the letter to school officials is petitioning activity protected by § 556	Court: letter was petitioning activity (step one met)
Whether Thurlow presented prima facie evidence that the petitioning activity was devoid of reasonable factual support	Thurlow argued his affidavit (specific denials, exoneration) and complaint supplied prima facie proof	Nelsons argued Thurlow’s submissions were insufficient; trial court agreed	Court: Thurlow met prima facie burden on at least one allegation and on actual injury; step two satisfied
Whether Gaudette I’s third‑step (preponderance/evidentiary hearing) infringes the right to a jury trial	Thurlow argued anti‑SLAPP procedure must not abrogate his right to jury trial and access to courts	Nelsons (and dissent) argued a preponderance fact‑finding step was necessary to preserve strong protection for petitioning activity	Court: Third‑step abandoned to avoid constitutional conflict; revert to Nader I two‑step prima facie framework
Whether the trial court erred by denying a hearing and failing to give Thurlow favorable inferences	Thurlow argued the court should have credited his affidavit and given favorable inferences and a hearing	Nelsons argued the record did not support a prima facie showing and dismissal was proper	Court: Trial court erred; must deny special motion because Thurlow met prima facie showing

Key Cases Cited

Morse Brothers, Inc. v. Webster, 772 A.2d 842 (Me. 2001) (adopted an initial two‑step anti‑SLAPP framework)
Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 41 A.3d 551 (Me. 2012) (established prima facie standard favoring the nonmoving plaintiff in anti‑SLAPP review)
Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 66 A.3d 571 (Me. 2013) (reiterated Nader I two‑step approach for anti‑SLAPP motions)
Gaudette v. Davis, 160 A.3d 1190 (Me. 2017) (added a third‑step requiring an evidentiary hearing and preponderance proof; later abandoned in this case)
Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862 (Wash. 2015) (held anti‑SLAPP fact‑finding that decides disputed material facts may violate right to jury trial)
Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010) (noted concern that judge resolution of disputed facts under anti‑SLAPP can implicate jury‑trial rights)
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935 (Mass. 1998) (discussed SLAPPs and the legislative purpose of anti‑SLAPP statutes)
Camden Nat'l Bank v. Weintraub, 143 A.3d 788 (Me. 2016) (explained what can satisfy prima facie proof of actual injury)