John Mullin, II v. Temco Machinery, Incorporated
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20665
| 7th Cir. | 2013Background
- John Mullin, II (56) was a long‑time, top sales associate for Temco (fire trucks); he won Salesman of the Year in 2008–2009 and generated a large share of Indiana profits.
- In 2009–2010 Temco hired Ronald Baylog as VP/GM for Indiana; Baylog implemented weekly call reports, Monday meetings, and customer-targeting policies.
- In May 2010 Temco fired two older salesmen (including Mullin on May 13) and immediately brought on two inexperienced men in their 20s (Wolka and Timmer) who filled Mullin’s role.
- Temco told Mullin he was fired because he was "being paid too much for your sales" and later gave reasons including poor performance, missed events, late call reports, insubordination, lost sales, and improper email communication.
- Mullin filed an EEOC charge and suit under the ADEA alleging age discrimination; the district court granted summary judgment for Temco.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding disputes of material fact (timing of hires/fires, ambiguous age‑related statements, and contested factual bases for termination) sufficient to let a jury decide pretext and motive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Temco discharged Mullin because of his age in violation of the ADEA | Mullin: the timing of hires/fires, comments about youth, replacement by much younger inexperienced hires, and inconsistent/exaggerated reasons show age was a motivating factor | Temco: legitimate, non‑discriminatory reasons—declining performance, missed meetings/events, late call reports, lost sales, improper communications; financial decision to reduce cost | Reversed summary judgment: material disputes (timing, ambiguous statements, and credibility of proffered reasons) permit a reasonable jury to find age motivated the firing |
| Whether plaintiff presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to survive summary judgment under the direct method | Mullin: circumstantial evidence (suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, similarly situated younger hires, and shifting explanations) allows inference of discrimination | Temco: business judgment and performance-based explanations; multiple reasons offered | Held: Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to create triable issues; summary judgment inappropriate |
| Whether employer’s shifting/inconsistent explanations show pretext | Mullin: Temco’s reasons are contested, some inaccurate or unsupported (destroyed call reports, disputed missed events), and CEO’s initial financial rationale conflicts with hiring of similarly paid younger employees | Temco: offered multiple legitimate reasons for termination; mistakes do not automatically imply pretext | Held: inconsistencies and disputed facts raise credibility issues for the jury; pretext cannot be resolved on summary judgment |
| Whether mere employer mistakes bar finding of pretext | Mullin: cumulative inaccuracies and destroyed records undercut credibility of employer explanations | Temco: isolated mistakes are not evidence of discrimination | Held: A mere mistake alone is insufficient, but multiple inaccuracies and shifting explanations can support an inference of pretext for a jury to weigh |
Key Cases Cited
- Good v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670 (7th Cir.) (standard for reviewing summary judgment in employment cases)
- Fleishman v. Continental Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598 (7th Cir.) (direct and indirect methods of proving discrimination)
- Van Antwerp v. City of Peoria, Ill., 627 F.3d 295 (7th Cir.) (age must have played a role and had determinative influence)
- Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683 (7th Cir.) (circumstantial evidence permits inference of intentional discrimination)
- Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712 (7th Cir.) (framework for circumstantial evidence categories)
- Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799 (7th Cir.) (three categories of circumstantial evidence to infer discrimination)
- Filar v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 526 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir.) (suspicious timing of personnel decisions can support inference of discrimination)
- Piraino v. Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270 (7th Cir.) (timing of policy changes can suggest discriminatory motive)
- Hudson v. Chi. Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552 (7th Cir.) (pretext requires more than employer mistake; honest explanation is key)
- Stalter v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285 (7th Cir.) (changing employer explanations is evidence of pretext)
- Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733 (7th Cir.) (summary judgment standards for ADEA claims)
- Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff must present evidence a rational jury could conclude adverse action was due to protected status)
- Park v. City of Chi., 297 F.3d 606 (7th Cir.) (spoliation/destruction of documents does not alone warrant adverse inference)