John Montin v. Bill Gibson, 718 F.3d 752

Plaintiff John Maxwell Montin is an involuntarily committed mental patient at Lincoln Regional Center’s secure forensic unit since 1994 after an NGRI verdict.
Montin sued facility officials alleging a facility-wide policy change removed his prior ability to walk unsupervised in an unsecured area of the grounds.
He asserted substantive due process claims: (1) deprivation of liberty in avoiding unnecessary bodily restraint, and (2) violation of a state-created liberty interest requiring the least restrictive setting and medically appropriate treatment.
The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding the policy did not constitute bodily restraint nor a conscience-shocking violation of state-created liberty interests.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo, treated the federal and Nebraska constitutional claims as co-extensive for the issues presented, and affirmed the district court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether denying unsupervised walks in unsecured grounds constitutes an unconstitutional "bodily restraint" under Youngberg	Montin: policy denying unsupervised access is an unnecessary bodily restraint violating liberty interest to avoid restraint	Defendants: policy is a security measure incident to lawful commitment, not a bodily restraint	Court: Not a bodily restraint; even if it were, Youngberg's professional-judgment test defeats the claim
Whether the policy violated a state-created liberty interest in least restrictive setting / medically appropriate treatment	Montin: policy limited clinicians’ treatment recommendations, producing overly restrictive confinement contrary to state law	Defendants: policy is lawful security practice and does not mandate improper treatment or confinement	Court: Even assuming a state-created interest, the action was not "conscience-shocking" and thus no substantive due process violation
Whether any procedural due process claim was adequately pleaded	Montin: (attempts in captions) alleges procedural deprivation	Defendants: district court viewed procedural claim as indistinguishable from abandoned equal protection claim	Court: Procedural claim not meaningfully distinct from substantive claims and not adequately articulated; treated as abandoned

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1982) (civilly committed persons have liberty interest to be free from unnecessary bodily restraint; professional-judgment standard applies)
Ky. Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (U.S. 1989) (protected liberty interests may arise from state law)
Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2012) (physical restraints such as wrist chains and leg irons characterized as bodily restraints)
Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing Youngberg and applying conscience-shocking standard when Youngberg does not apply)
Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 1996) (use of tight bindings on a child described as substantive restraint)
Burton v. Richmond, 370 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 2004) (describing the "conscience-shocking" standard for non-Youngberg claims)
Montin v. Estate of Johnson, 636 F.3d 409 (8th Cir. 2011) (prior interlocutory opinion addressing procedural and statute-of-limitations issues)